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CONSENT, APPROPRIATION BY MANIPULATION, AND 
THE 10-YEAR CHALLENGE: HOW AN INTERNET MEME 
COMPLICATED BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY 
Michael J. Slobom* 
ABSTRACT 
 
In 2019, a viral Internet meme called the “10-Year Challenge” 
flooded social-media newsfeeds, asking users the question: “How hard did 
aging hit you?” Users responded by sharing side-by-side photographs of 
themselves from 2009 and 2019 with their followers. While the challenge 
spread across social-media platforms, commentators began speculating 
about the challenge's origins after a writer for Wired magazine published an 
op-ed questioning whether Facebook used the challenge to train its facial 
recognition technology. The op-ed argued that the challenge, while 
seemingly harmless, could provide Facebook with a sufficient dataset to 
train its facial recognition technology on age progression. While Facebook 
denied playing a role in generating the challenge, the op-ed poignantly 
observes the chilling possibility of tech companies using manipulative tactics 
to compel disclosure of otherwise private information. 
This Article examines the potential remedies available to 
consumers who have been manipulated into surrendering their biometric 
data. Using the 10-Year Challenge as a test case, this Article assesses the 
viability of the causes of actions currently available to consumers who have 
surrendered their biometric data as a result of manipulative, or at least less-
than-forthright, data-collection tactics and concludes that neither common-
law tort claims nor recently enacted biometric privacy laws at the state level 
provide adequate protection from campaigns designed to manipulate 
consumers into surrendering their private information. Congress must 
address these types of tactics when crafting broader federal privacy 
legislation; this Article proposes a legislative starting point. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Internet memes have emerged as a primary method of communication 
in the age of social media.1 Social-media users create and share memes to 
evoke humor or irony, to spread political messages, and to participate in 
online challenges, among other purposes.2 In January 2019, a new viral 
meme flooded social-media newsfeeds. What later became known as the 
“10-Year Challenge” asked social-media users to answer the question “How 
hard did aging hit you?” by sharing side-by-side photographs of themselves 
from 2009 and 2019.3 Over 5.2 million users participated in the challenge, 
with some users providing their audiences with helpful context behind the 
photos, such as the dates and locations of when and where the photos were 
taken.4 
Speculation over the challenge’s origins quickly arose when Kate 
O’Neill, a writer for Wired magazine, published an op-ed questioning 
whether Facebook engineered the challenge.5 O’Neill argued that the 
challenge, while seemingly harmless, could provide Facebook with a clean 
dataset sufficient to train its facial recognition technology on age 
progression: 
Imagine that you wanted to train a facial recognition algorithm on 
age-related characteristics and, more specifically, on age 
progression (e.g., how people are likely to look as they get older). 
Ideally, you’d want a broad and rigorous dataset with lots of 
people’s pictures. It would help if you knew they were taken a 
fixed number of years apart—say, 10 years. 
Sure, you could mine Facebook for profile pictures and look at 
posting dates or EXIF data. But that whole set of profile pictures 
could end up generating a lot of useless noise. People don’t 
reliably upload pictures in chronological order, and it is not 
                                                           
1 Perry Kostidakis, The Evolution of Memes, COMPLEX (Mar. 13, 2019), 
https://bit.ly/2D6anMw [https://perma.cc/2TNE-V6VF]. 
2 See This Is Where Internet Memes Come From, MIT TECH. REV. (June 11, 2018), 
https://bit.ly/349tT75 [https://perma.cc/YA3D-52VK] (noting Internet memes have also 
been used “to spread aggressive or racist messages and to incite hatred”). 
3 See Rebecca Jennings, Why You’re Seeing the 10-Year Challenge Everywhere, VOX (Jan. 
16, 2019), https://bit.ly/2QStyOp [https://perma.cc/2YFJ-GM3R]. 
4 Nicole Martin, Was the Facebook ‘10 Year Challenge’ A Way to Mine Data for Facial 
Recognition AI?, FORBES (Jan. 17, 2019), https://bit.ly/2GJSPZZ [https://perma.cc/B8R6-
J46M]. 
5 See Kate O’Neill, Facebook’s ‘10 Year Challenge’ Is Just a Harmless Meme—Right?, 
WIRED (Jan. 15, 2019), https://bit.ly/2CmCK8L [https://perma.cc/PDN9-VNT6]. 
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uncommon for users to post pictures of something other than 
themselves as a profile picture.6  
O’Neill’s piece quickly gained traction. Within days, various media 
outlets, including NPR, The New York Times, Forbes, and Vox, also ran 
pieces questioning Facebook’s use of the challenge.7 The Forbes piece even 
quoted one scholar who characterized the challenge as a “perfect storm for 
machine learning.”8 
While Facebook denied playing a role in generating the challenge,9 
O’Neill’s theory does not fall outside the realm of possibility given 
Facebook’s history of surreptitiously exploiting its users’ data.10 And even if 
the challenge was not an attempt at social engineering, O’Neill’s op-ed 
poignantly observes the chilling possibility of tech companies—such as 
Facebook with its more than two billion users11—using seemingly harmless 
campaigns as pretext for compelling the disclosure of otherwise private 
information.12 
                                                           
6 Id. EXIF stands for Exchangeable Image File Format. EXIF data is information that is 
recorded and stored within an image file when a photograph is taken and contains details 
about when, where, and how the photo was taken. See Thomas Germain, How a Photo’s 
Hidden ‘Exif’ Data Exposes Your Personal Information, CONSUMER REP. (Dec, 6, 2019), 
https://bit.ly/2XJEJjK [https://perma.cc/6EUA-MXS9]. Critics questioned O’Neill’s 
premise, arguing that because Facebook already has access to the photos it does not need to 
manipulate users into re-posting the images. See Kate O’Neill (@kateo), TWITTER (Jan. 13, 
2019, 9:46 AM), https://bit.ly/2DIGphT [https://perma.cc/W76Z-NTP2] (“Most common 
rebuttal in my mentions: ‘That data is already available. Facebook's already got all the profile 
pictures.’”). In response, O’Neill pointed out that many Facebook users do not upload 
photos immediately after the photos were taken and many users’ profile pictures display 
images not of themselves, but of cartoons and animals. See Martin, supra note 4. 
7 Amanda Morris, Could The 10-Year Challenge Be Putting Your Data At Risk?, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Jan. 20, 2019), https://n.pr/2RF4eAJ [https://perma.cc/LQC4-8SUZ]; Jacey 
Fortin, Are ‘10-Year Challenge’ Photos a Boon to Facebook’s Facial Recognition 
Technology?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2X4pSgY 
[https://perma.cc/H3ZY-FYUC]; Martin, supra note 4; Jennings, supra note 3. 
8 Martin, supra note 4. 
9 Facebook (@facebook), TWITTER (Jan. 16, 2019, 3:08 PM), https://bit.ly/2MfytZ4 
[https://perma.cc/JP9C-VUP9] [hereinafter Facebook Response]. 
10 See Elizabeth Dwoskin et al., Facebook Allegedly Offered Advertisers Special Access to 
Users’ Data and Activities, According to Documents Released by British Lawmakers, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 5, 2018), https://wapo.st/2X2HI3T [https://perma.cc/5LFF-SXKS] (describing 
internal Facebook emails that suggest Facebook used users’ data as a bargaining chip to 
attract advertisers). 
11 See Fortin, supra note 7. 
12 Similar concerns arose again in July 2019 when FaceApp, an app that can edit photos of 
people’s faces to show younger or older versions of themselves, went viral. See Thomas 
Brewster, FaceApp: Is The Russian Face-Aging App A Danger To Your Privacy?, FORBES 
(July 17, 2019), https://bit.ly/2KRsdaG [https://perma.cc/PL5G-ER2G]. While the majority 
4
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 5
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol46/iss5/5
2020] 10-YEAR CHALLENGE  1155 
These concerns underscore the cries of information privacy law 
scholars for federal legislation recognizing a right to privacy in one’s own 
biometric data.13 Biometric identifiers are intrinsic physical and behavioral 
human characteristics, such as fingerprints, DNA, iris patterns, voice, gait, 
and facial geometry.14 Both state and private actors collect and store 
biometric information in databases designed to assist with identifying or 
verifying peoples’ identities.15 Facebook, for example, has collected and 
stored facial biometrics using facial recognition technology since 2010.16 
Facial recognition technology measures the curves of a person’s face on a 
sub-millimeter scale and then matches the measurements to other images 
stored in a database or on a device.17 Common measurements include the 
distance between eyes, width of the nose, depth of the eye sockets, shape of 
the cheekbones, and length of the jaw line.18 According to Facebook’s 
Deputy Chief Privacy Officer, Facebook uses the data strictly for improving 
user experience (i.e., making the “tagging” feature more user friendly, 
preventing online impersonation, and assisting people with visual 
                                                           
of concerns initially raised proved untrue, FaceApp’s viral moment nevertheless 
demonstrated “how quickly millions of faces could be gathered up for nefarious purposes.” 
Chip Brownlee, How Worried Should You Be About FaceApp?, SLATE (July 18, 2019), 
https://bit.ly/2qvQXhN [https://perma.cc/5C6L-MJL8]. 
13 See, e.g., Hannah Zimmerman, The Data of You: Regulating Private Industry's Collection 
of Biometric Information, 66 KAN. L. REV. 637, 656–71 (2018); Carra Pope, Note & 
Comment, Biometric Data Collection in an Unprotected World: Exploring the Need for 
Federal Legislation Protecting Biometric Data, 26 J.L. & POL’Y 769, 797–802 (2018); Yana 
Welinder, A Face Tells More than a Thousand Posts: Developing Face Recognition Privacy 
in Social Networks, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 165, 197 (2012) (“Federal legislation is more 
desirable . . . .”); Lisa J. McGuire, Comment, Banking on Biometrics: Your Bank’s New 
High-Tech Method of Identification May Mean Giving Up Your Privacy, 33 AKRON L. REV. 
441, 476–80 (2000). 
14 Biometrics, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://bit.ly/2TJoUES 
[https://perma.cc/78LW-RJAT]. 
15 See id. 
16 See Camila Domonoske, Facebook Expands Use of Facial Recognition to ID Users in 
Photos, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 19, 2017), https://n.pr/2Bmdkdt [https://perma.cc/C9UF-
NL92]. In September 2019, Facebook announced that it would no longer automatically 
collect its users’ facial biometrics and would instead turn on its facial recognition technology 
only when a user opts in. See Srinivas Narayanan, An Update About Face Recognition on 
Facebook, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Sept. 3, 2019), https://bit.ly/2QKyDMv 
[https://perma.cc/TX2T-AHP2]. 
17 See Kevin Bonsor & Ryan Johnson, How Facial Recognition Systems Work, 
HOWSTUFFWORKS, https://bit.ly/2jqAbZQ [https://perma.cc/PL67-NCPT]; Facial 
Recognition, FIND BIOMETRICS, https://bit.ly/2t8z5qB [https://perma.cc/D6UA-TW48] 
[hereinafter Facial Recognition]. For a discussion of facial recognition technology, as well as 
other biometric technology, see infra Part I. 
18 Bonsor & Johnson, supra note 17. 
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impairments).19 Meanwhile, critics have pointed out that Facebook also uses 
facial recognition “to support its research into artificial technology, which 
Facebook hopes will lead to new platforms to place more focused targeted 
ads.”20 
While the U.S. government has acknowledged the highly sensitive, 
private nature of biometric data,21 no federal statute currently regulates its 
collection or use by private actors.22 Thus, absent state statutory 
protections,23 consumers are left to resort to common-law claims. Even still, 
actors who profit from collecting consumers’ biometric data can arguably 
dodge liability by simply disclosing their data-collection practices in well-
drafted terms-of-service agreements24—even when consumers have 
surrendered their data as a consequence of an actor’s manipulative tactics.25 
This Article examines the potential remedies currently available to 
consumers manipulated into surrendering their biometric data to interested 
data collectors. Using the 10-Year Challenge as a test case, this Article 
assesses the viability of the most relevant common-law and statutory causes 
of actions as well as the state statutory protections that do not afford private 
rights of action. This Article argues that neither common-law tort claims, 
nor state biometric privacy laws adequately protect consumers against 
campaigns designed to manipulate disclosure of biometric information. 
                                                           
19 See Rob Sherman, Hard Questions: Should I Be Afraid of Face Recognition Technology?, 
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Dec. 19, 2017), https://bit.ly/2AtZq3T [https://perma.cc/MTQ2-
TCL6]. 
20 Jared Bennett, Saving Face: Facebook Wants Access Without Limits, CTR. FOR PUB. 
INTEGRITY (July 31, 2017), https://bit.ly/2BuTb3a [https://perma.cc/CRB8-YX5F]. 
21 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB MEM. NO. 07-
16, SAFEGUARDING AGAINST AND RESPONDING TO THE BREACH OF PERSONALLY 
IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION 1 n.1 (2007), https://bit.ly/2I9a8G1 [https://perma.cc/AVL4-
XJDR] [hereinafter OMB MEMO] (including “biometric records” in the category of 
“personally identifiable information”). 
22 See Biometric Data and the General Data Protection Regulation, GEMALTO (Aug. 20, 
2018), https://bit.ly/2SrudI3 [https://perma.cc/QSK4-7CYE] [hereinafter Biometric Data]. 
23 Id. Currently, only Illinois, Washington State, and Texas have passed laws regulating the 
collection of biometric information. Of the three states that have passed such laws, only 
Illinois provides individuals with the right to sue for damages. Jason P. Stiehl et al., New 
Biometric Information Privacy Cases Reveal Breadth of Potential Exposure for Companies, 
LEXOLOGY (Mar. 5, 2018), https://bit.ly/2URU9xu [https://perma.cc/9NUU-3MZB]. 
24 For instance, Facebook discloses its use of facial recognition technology to create facial 
recognition templates in its data policy. See Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://bit.ly/1wYGJjt 
[https://perma.cc/QS6G-399J]. Agreeing to Facebook’s data policy is a precondition to using 
Facebook’s products. See Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://bit.ly/1mAamz3 
[https://perma.cc/49CR-K3PY]. 
25 See infra Section III.A.2, III.B.2. 
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This Article then argues that future federal privacy legislation must address 
these types of tactics. 
Part I of this Article first provides an overview of biometric 
technologies, including the technologies’ primary functions. It then 
discusses how private entities use biometric technologies and the value of 
collecting, storing, and distributing individuals’ biometric traits.26 Part II 
overviews the right to privacy, including its origins and the common-law tort 
claims that emerged therefrom. Part II also provides a brief overview of 
constitutional privacy protections, focusing primarily on the intersection of 
Fourth Amendment privacy interests and modern technology. Using the 10-
Year Challenge as a test case, Part III assesses the viability of causes of action 
currently available to consumers who have suffered privacy injuries as a 
result of private companies’ manipulative data-collection tactics, which this 
Article refers to as “appropriation by manipulation.” Section III.A examines 
the most pertinent privacy tort—appropriation of name or likeness27—and 
demonstrates how that tort provides an insufficient safeguard against 
appropriation by manipulation in the biometric-data context. Section III.B 
briefly overviews existing state biometric privacy statutes and demonstrates 
how those statutes, in current form, do not adequately protect consumers 
against appropriation by manipulation in the biometric-data context. Finally, 
Part IV proposes a starting point for addressing these concerns through 
broader federal biometric privacy legislation. 
A. An Overview of Biometrics and Facial Recognition Technology 
“Biometrics” is a term used to refer to either characteristics or 
processes.28 As characteristics, biometrics refers to a person’s “measurable 
biological (anatomical and physiological) or behavioral aspects . . . that can 
be used for automated recognition.”29 As processes, biometrics refers to 
                                                           
26 This author does not claim to be an expert in biometric technologies. Instead, Part I’s 
overview of biometric technologies is based on research and discussions with people familiar 
with the technology. 
27 Although there is an argument to be made for addressing the applicability of the intrusion 
upon seclusion tort, see Carmen Aguado, Comment, Facebook or Face Bank?, 32 LOY. 
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 187, 215–16 (2011), it is not sufficiently strong enough to warrant 
consideration in this Article. The intrusion upon seclusion tort focuses on the “solitude or 
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977). By posting photographs to Facebook, users remove 
information from the private sphere into the public sphere, thus making the information 
public. 
28 NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, PRIVACY & BIOMETRICS: BUILDING A CONCEPTUAL 
FOUNDATION 4 (2006). 
29 Id. 
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“automated methods of recognizing an individual based on” those 
characteristics.30 “Biometric technologies” are the technologies that perform 
the biometric processes.31 
II. PRIMARY FUNCTIONS OF BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY 
A. Identification and Verification 
Biometric technologies perform two main functions: identification and 
verification.32 Biometric identification is the process of comparing an 
individual’s biometric data to a number of biometric “templates” stored in 
a database,33 with the goal of answering the question “Who are you?”34 For 
instance, Facebook’s now-abolished “Tag Suggestions” feature35 used facial 
recognition technology to identify its users. The technology first analyzed a 
single face appearing in a photograph and then compared the facial 
                                                           
30 Id. 
31 See The Future of Biometric Technology: Convenience or Privacy?, THOMSON REUTERS 
(June 2, 2017), https://tmsnrt.rs/2qkpoHt [https://perma.cc/VYC6-2F9S]. 
32 See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 28, at 11. In addition to these primary 
functions, biometric technologies also perform a “categorization” function. See infra Section 
I.A.2. The categorization function is less common. 
33 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROT. WORKING PARTY, OPINION 3/2012 ON DEVELOPMENTS IN 
BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES 5 (2012), https://bit.ly/2nzLzbf [https://perma.cc/MPT5-2L92] 
[hereinafter DPWP MARCH 2012 OPINION]. Identification is referred to as “one-to-many” 
or “1:N” identification because the single dataset is compared to many different biometric 
templates linked to many different individuals. See The Difference Between 1:N, 1:1, and 
1:Few and Why It Matters in Patient ID, RIGHTPATIENT (Sept. 23, 2015), 
https://bit.ly/2nxF74y [https://perma.cc/EE7M-54KZ] [hereinafter The Difference Between 
1:N, 1:1, and 1:Few].  
34 See Ian E. Muller, Identification vs Verification: What’s the Difference?, VERIDIUM (July 
12, 2018), https://bit.ly/2mFE02H [https://perma.cc/6R5X-N7N4]. 
35 In September 2019, Facebook announced its plan to replace the Tag Suggestions feature 
with a broader “face recognition setting.” See Narayanan, supra note 16. The Tag Suggestions 
setting was enabled by default and used facial recognition technology to automatically suggest 
tagging other users in photos posted to Facebook’s platform. See id. The new face 
recognition setting requires users to “opt in” to Facebook’s use of facial recognition 
technology and provides additional services. See id. In addition, Facebook claims that if a 
user chooses to disable the face recognition setting, then Facebook will delete that user’s face 
template from its database. See What Is the Face Recognition Setting on Facebook and How 
Does It Work?, FACEBOOK HELP CTR., https://bit.ly/37H5eJc [https://perma.cc/JK4C-
CXS9] [hereinafter Facebook Face Recognition]. Facebook implemented the change after 
the Federal Trade Commission imposed a $5 billion fine on the company, citing Facebook’s 
practice of enabling the Tag Suggestions feature by default while suggesting to consumers 
that Facebook’s facial recognition technology was opt in. See Blake Montgomery, Facebook 
Makes Facial Recognition Opt-In Instead of Automatically Scanning Users’ Faces, DAILY 
BEAST (Sept. 3, 2019), https://bit.ly/2MN2UIh [https://perma.cc/2PW8-NMNR]. 
8
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biometrics with all previously stored facial biometrics to determine the 
identity associated with the face in the photograph.36 
Biometric verification, on the other hand, verifies a person’s identity 
by comparing his or her biometric data with a single biometric template 
stored in a database or on a device.37 Much like a PIN or password, 
biometric verification is used to answer the question “Are you who you say 
you are?”38 For instance, Apple’s “Touch ID” allows iPhone users to unlock 
their iPhones and authorize iTunes Store purchases by verifying the users’ 
identities using a fingerprint reader built into the phone’s home button.39 
A short overview of a typical biometric system’s data-collection, data-
storage, and data-comparison processes demonstrates how these functions 
work. Generally, three components of a typical biometric system perform 
the collection and storage processes: 
1. A sensor that observes characteristics and converts the 
observations into data that can be stored in electronic form. 
2. Signal processing algorithms that perform quality control 
activities on the collected data and develop [a] biometric template 
[of the subject] . . . . 
3. A data storage component that manages all of the data 
collected, including data from the initial and all future collections 
and processing.40 
By way of example, facial recognition technology uses sensors to 
capture images of a person’s face and identify numerous, distinguishable 
“landmarks,” such as points on the chin, nose, and cheekbones (i.e., the 
observation phase).41 After capturing the images, which can be gathered 
through both 2D images, such as photos and videos, and 3D facial scans,42 
                                                           
36 Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1268 (9th Cir. 2019) (discussing the mechanics of 
Facebook’s Tag Suggestions feature); see also April Glaser, Facebook Will Tell You How 
to Turn Off Facial Recognition. Why Wait?, SLATE (Sept. 3, 2019), https://bit.ly/2munKlm 
[https://perma.cc/H9YM-CVPR] (“By recognizing faces and suggesting users tag their friends 
and themselves in uploaded photos, the company has built what could be the largest name-
to-face database in the world.”). Although not much information regarding Facebook’s new 
face recognition setting has been made available, the new setting likely uses the same 
processes, consistent with other facial recognition technology. Accord Bonsor & Johnson, 
supra note 17.  
37 See DPWP MARCH 2012 OPINION, supra note 33, at 6. 
38 See Muller, supra note 34. 
39 See Use Touch ID on iPhone or iPad, APPLE, https://apple.co/1ZVD2Jf 
[https://perma.cc/PSY7-36XM]. 
40 NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 28, at 4 (emphasis added). 
41 See Bonsor & Johnson, supra note 17; Steve Symanovich, How Does Facial Recognition 
Work?, NORTON, https://nr.tn/2GGM0W7 [https://perma.cc/4PPN-E2C8]. 
42 See Bonsor & Johnson, supra note 17. 
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the technology measures various distances between the landmarks (i.e., the 
conversion phase).43 The system then aggregates those measurements into a 
numerical code that comprises a person’s “faceprint” (i.e., the biometric 
template component).44 The system then stores the subject’s faceprint in a 
database (i.e., the data storage component) that it later accesses to compare 
with new images.45  
The identification and verification functions occur at the comparison 
stage. Generally, two components of a typical biometric system perform the 
comparison process: (1) “[a] matching algorithm that compares the new 
biometric template to one or more templates that may already be stored”; 
and (2) “a decision process (either automated or human-assisted) that uses 
the results from the matching component to make a system-level decision.”46 
A system verifying a person’s identity compares the person’s new biometric 
template to a previously stored biometric template associated with that 
individual (i.e., a “one-to-one” comparison), while a system that identifies a 
person compares that person’s new biometric template to many previously 
stored biometric templates associated with many different individuals (i.e., 
a “one-to-many” comparison).47 A match between the new template and the 
previously stored template completes the identification or verification 
process.48 
Today’s biometric technologies use various physiological and 
behavioral characteristics to perform identification and verification 
processes. The most implemented and studied biometric modalities49 are 
fingerprint, facial, iris, voice, signature, and hand-geometry recognitions.50 
These modalities nevertheless vary in accuracy and efficiency. For instance, 
facial recognition is a relatively efficient method of identifying and verifying 
                                                           
43 See id.; Symanovich, supra note 41. 
44 Bonsor & Johnson, supra note 17; Symanovich, supra note 41. 
45 The process of storing an individual’s faceprint in a biometric database for the first time is 
known as “enrollment.” ARTICLE 29 DATA PROT. WORKING PARTY, OPINION 02/2012 ON 
FACIAL RECOGNITION IN ONLINE AND MOBILE SERVICES 2 (2012), https://bit.ly/2o7vWrT 
[https://perma.cc/6C7B-EG4U]. 
46 NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 28, at 4–5. 
47 Id. at 7–10; The Difference Between 1:N, 1:1, and 1:Few, supra note 33. 
48 See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 28, at 4–5. 
49 The term “biometric modalities” refers to categories of biometric systems based on the 
biometric trait used to recognize an individual. See Biometrics – Modalities, 
TUTORIALSPOINT, https://bit.ly/2N8P56P [https://perma.cc/3N6Y-PSK3]. Biometric 
modalities fall under three types: physiological, such as fingerprint recognition; behavioral, 
such as gait or signature recognition; and a combination of both physiological and behavioral, 
such as voice recognition. Id. 
50 See Danny Thakkar, Top Five Biometrics: Face, Fingerprint, Iris, Palm and Voice, 
BAYOMETRIC, https://bit.ly/2OKNnq1 [https://perma.cc/CH94-2H8H]. 
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individuals, with technologies that allow users to capture the initial image 
using a standard digital camera even at relatively far distances.51 However, 
facial recognition technology has proven to be less accurate than other 
biometric modalities due to different variables that can corrupt the 
biometric template (e.g., sunglasses, poor lighting, and low-resolution 
images).52 Iris recognition technology, on the other hand, provides quite 
accurate results—it can even differentiate two genetically identical 
individuals.53 Nonetheless, iris recognition also has its limitations. For 
instance, current iris recognition technology cannot meet its objectives from 
great distances and requires the subject’s cooperation to obtain the data 
necessary to build the biometric template.54 
Some biometric systems employ a “multi-modal” approach to cure 
these accuracy defects.55 Multi-modal biometric systems collect multiple 
biometric traits belonging to a single person and consolidate those results to 
perform the identification or verification functions.56 For instance, a system 
that combines both facial recognition and fingerprint recognition can be 
considered a multi-modal biometric system.57 By tying more traits to an 
individual’s identity, the system becomes more likely to accurately and 
efficiently recognize that person.58 
B. Categorization 
Biometric technologies, and facial recognition technologies in 
particular, have been used increasingly to perform another function: 
categorization.59 The European Union’s Data Protection Working Party has 




54 Id. For instance, the subject often must look directly into the camera capturing the iris 
image. Id. 
55 DPWP MARCH 2012 OPINION, supra note 33, at 6, 17; see also Waleed Dahea & HS 
Fadewar, Multimodal Biometric System: A Review, 4 INT’L J. RES. ADVANCED 
ENGINEERING & TECH. 25, 26 (2018). “In addition, multimodal biometric system can 
effectively deal with a variety of issues such as noisy data, intra-class variations, limited degrees 
of freedom, non-universality, spoof attacks, and unacceptable error rates which may be 
caused by unimodal biometric systems.” See Multimodal Biometrics—A More Accurate 
Identification System, IRITECH, INC. (Apr. 30, 2015), https://bit.ly/2ntTZ4f 
[https://perma.cc/RMR8-7VQU] [hereinafter A More Accurate Identification System]. 
56 Dahea & Fadewar, supra note 55, at 26; DPWP MARCH 2012 OPINION, supra note 33, at 
6. 
57 See A More Accurate Identification System, supra note 55. 
58 See id.; Dahea & Fadewar, supra note 55, at 26. 
59 See DPWP MARCH 2012 OPINION, supra note 33, 5–6; see also Derek Hawkins, 
Researchers Use Facial Recognition Tools to Predict Sexual Orientation. LGBT Groups 
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defined biometric categorization as “the process of establishing whether the 
biometric data of an individual belongs to a group with some predefined 
characteristic in order to take a specific action.”60 Biometric categorization 
aims not to identify a person or verify a person’s identity but rather to place 
biometric data into categories, such as age and gender.61 The data can then 
be stored, analyzed, and used to predict whether other people belong in that 
same category.62 
A controversial 2018 study conducted by researchers at Stanford 
University suggested that facial recognition technology can predict an 
individual’s sexual orientation more accurately than humans can.63 The 
researchers fed more than 35,000 photographs of roughly 15,000 self-
identified gay and heterosexual men and women into an algorithm that 
analyzed the subtle differences in the faces appearing in the images.64 The 
researchers then showed photographs of new faces to the software and 
asked it to predict each person’s sexual orientation.65 According to the 
researchers, the results showed that the software accurately distinguished 
between gay and heterosexual men eighty-one percent of the time and 
between gay and heterosexual women seventy-one percent of the time.66 
                                                           
Aren’t Happy., WASH. POST (Sept. 12, 2017), https://wapo.st/2ffzvVC 
[https://perma.cc/QPV6-J4QB]; Daniel Thomas, The Cameras that Know if You’re 
Happy—or a Threat, BBC (July 17, 2018), https://bbc.in/2P41MP4 [https://perma.cc/K3TD-
EFHB]. 
60 DPWP MARCH 2012 OPINION, supra note 33, at 6.  
61 See id. 
62 See id.; see also Hawkins, supra note 59; Thomas, supra note 59. 
63 See Yilun Wang & Michal Kosinski, Deep Neural Networks Are More Accurate Than 
Humans at Detecting Sexual Orientation from Facial Images, 114 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 246 (2018). The study faced significant backlash, with some criticizing the study 
for its methodology, the conclusions that the researchers drew from results, and some of the 
basic assumptions underlying those conclusions. See Jeremy Howard, Can Neural Nets 
Detect Sexual Orientation? A Data Scientist’s Perspective, FAST.AI (Sept. 13, 2017), 
https://bit.ly/2JnRtEA [https://perma.cc/K5DU-G6S9]. LGBTQ rights groups also criticized 
the study, claiming the study was based on “flawed research” and could be used by brutal 
regimes across the world to persecute people believed to be gay. See Drew Anderson, 
GLAAD and HRC Call on Stanford University & Responsible Media to Debunk Dangerous 
& Flawed Report Claiming to Identify LGBTQ People Through Facial Recognition 
Technology, GLAAD (Sept. 8, 2017), https://bit.ly/31UFUuR [https://perma.cc/9E2M-
G8N5]. This author expresses no view on the validity of the study but cites the study only to 
demonstrate the ways in which facial recognition technology has been used to attempt to 
categorize people. 
64 Wang & Kosinski, supra note 63, at 248–49. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 250. 
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Some biometric technologies have categorized people based on other, 
less-controversial characteristics.67 For instance, some technology 
companies now claim to possess the ability to detect a person’s mood using 
facial recognition technology.68 Market-research agencies have begun using 
this technology to assess consumers’ reactions to television advertisements.69 
In 2012, Walmart filed a patent application signaling the company’s intent 
to use facial-recognition technology to detect customers’ moods.70 The 
Walmart technology would reportedly monitor customers’ facial 
expressions attempting to identify dissatisfied customers at the checkout 
lines.71  
C. Current Uses and Value of Biometrics 
The ever-growing use of biometrics and biometric technology has 
already begun changing the ways in which society operates. Private 
companies have begun replacing traditional methods of verification with 
biometric technologies,72 and these shifts come with certain advantages. A 
person might forget or share a password or PIN, or an unauthorized person 
might find a key or token and use it to gain access to a person’s sensitive 
information. With biometrics, these problems do not exist: people are 
unlikely to lose or share fingerprints and, absent significant advances in 3D-
                                                           
67 See, e.g., Mehedi Hassan, Which Is the Most Reliable Biometric Modality?, M2SYS 
BLOG, https://bit.ly/364rxHK [https://perma.cc/7VHM-DQWM] (discussing biometric 
technology’s unique ability to identify people by observing behavioral and physical 
attributes); Wang & Kosinski, supra note 63 (positing that people lack the ability to detect 
and interpret certain revealing facial traits that machines can detect and interpret). 
68 See Thomas, supra note 59 (discussing facial recognition technology that is designed to 
detect dissatisfied customers); George Anderson, Walmart’s Facial Recognition Technology 
Would Overstep Boundaries, FORBES (July 27, 2017), https://bit.ly/33X3HMg 
[https://perma.cc/5FZB-FSUF] (discussing Walmart’s application for a patent on facial 
recognition technology designed to detect dissatisfied customers). Amazon has touted its 
facial recognition service, which is part of a larger suite of image-analysis features called 
Rekognition, for its ability to detect emotions using facial recognition technology and then 
placing those emotions into several categories, including “happy,” “sad,” “angry,” 
“surprised,” “disgusted,” “calm,” “confused,” and, most recently, “fear.” Tom Simonite, 
Amazon Says It Can Detect Fear on Your Face. You Scared?, WIRED (Aug. 18, 2019), 
https://bit.ly/2JkdSTs [https://perma.cc/SA64-B5EG]. 
69 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 59. 
70 See Hayley Peterson, Walmart Is Developing a Robot that Identifies Unhappy Shoppers, 
BUS. INSIDER (July 19, 2017), https://bit.ly/35VTrFQ [https://perma.cc/U5LN-9KBF]. 
71 Id. 
72 See Thakkar, supra note 50 (“[Biometric] technology [has] been successfully implemented 
in various real-life applications such as forensics, government agencies, banking and financial 
institutions, enterprise identity management and other identification and recognition 
purposes.”). 
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printing technology, would-be identity thieves are unlikely to duplicate a 
person’s facial geometry.73 Even biometric identification technology 
provides some advantages. For instance, biometric identification technology 
has been used to recover missing persons and identify criminal suspects.74 
Other potential advantages of this type of technology include the arguable 
benefit of consumer convenience and shoplifting prevention.75 
But a darker, and perhaps more insidious, side of biometrics exists. 
Mobile software applications and the tech companies behind them collect 
massive amounts of information about consumers each day;76 online search 
engines, such as Google, and social-media sites covertly gather and store 
                                                           
73 It should be noted, however, that at least one reporter has used a 3D-printed replica of his 
own head to successfully unlock several Android phones. See Thomas Brewster, We Broke 
into a Bunch of Android Phones with a 3D-Printed Head, FORBES (Dec. 13, 2019), 
https://bit.ly/2JlXzW1 [https://perma.cc/U2UZ-T2KM]. The reporter could not break into 
Apple’s iPhone. See id. 
74 See Anthony Cuthbertson, Indian Police Trace 3,000 Missing Children in Just Four Days 
Using Facial Recognition Technology, INDEP. (Apr. 24, 2018), https://bit.ly/2JjuUAZ 
[https://perma.cc/HQW2-H8K4]; Jon Schuppe, How Facial Recognition Became a Routine 
Policing Tool in America, NBC NEWS (May 11, 2019), https://nbcnews.to/2Pjo1n0 
[https://perma.cc/UJ8Y-H9Y6]. This use of facial recognition technology also has its 
downsides. For instance, the technology’s false-match rates disproportionately impact 
women and people of color. See Steve Lohr, Facial Recognition Is Accurate, if You’re a 
White Guy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2BZ9Z2d [https://perma.cc/64ZL-
VLWT]. The ACLU of Massachusetts recently conducted a test using Amazon’s facial 
recognition technology to determine the technology’s accuracy. See Facial Recognition 
Technology Falsely Identifies Famous Athletes, ACLU MASS. (Oct. 21, 2019), 
https://bit.ly/2Wb0beB [https://perma.cc/MS97-ZUVV]. According to the ACLU, 
Amazon’s technology mistakenly matched 27 professional athletes’ faces to criminal 
mugshots. See id. Some states have begun introducing legislation that would prohibit police 
from using facial recognition technology in conjunction with body cameras. See Chris Mills 
Rodrigo, California Blocks Police Body Cameras from Using Facial Recognition, HILL (Oct. 
9, 2019), https://bit.ly/2BEJlv5 [https://perma.cc/65QY-UBPQ]. 
75 See Leticia Miranda, Thousands of Stores Will Soon Use Facial Recognition, and They 
Won’t Need Your Consent, BUZZFEED NEWS (Aug. 17, 2018), https://bit.ly/2JpEEJS 
[https://perma.cc/YQ5S-3WTY]; Jeff John Roberts, Walmart’s Use of Sci-fi Tech to Spot 
Shoplifters Raises Privacy Questions, FORTUNE (Nov. 9, 2015), https://bit.ly/31PYxAm 
[https://perma.cc/6ZCN-R5EF]. 
76 See Nicole Perlroth & Nick Bilton, Mobile Apps Take Data Without Permission, N.Y. 
TIMES: BITS (Feb. 15, 2012), https://nyti.ms/2MOg081 [https://perma.cc/8XFP-9XF8] 
(“Companies that make many of the most popular smartphone apps for Apple and Android 
devices . . . routinely gather the information in personal address books on the phone and in 
some cases store it on their own computers.”). 
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hundreds of millions of consumers’ facial biometrics;77 and the motives 
underlying these practices go beyond consumer convenience.78  
The federal government currently classifies biometric data as 
“personally identifiable information” (PII).79 PII is loosely defined as any 
information that can be used to trace a person’s identity.80 In addition to 
                                                           
77 Cf. Aguado, supra note 27, at 192 (“By 2009, there were more than thirty publicly available 
databases for facial recognition analysis. Today, applications such as Google’s Picasa, Apple 
iPhoto, Sony’s Picture Motion Browser, Windows Live Photo Gallery, and Facebook, all 
use facial recognition technology.”). 
78 See Anne T. McKenna, Pass Parallel Privacy Standards or Privacy Perishes, 65 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 1041, 1067 (2013) (“[C]ollected, stored, and accessible biometric data provides vast 
potential for financial gain for international, national, and local private entities.”). 
79 See, e.g., 2 C.F.R. § 200.82 (2019) (defining “protected” PII); 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (2019) 
(defining PII in the education context); 6 C.F.R. § 37.3 (2019) (defining PII in the 
identification-card context); 41 C.F.R. § 105-64.001 (2019) (defining PII under the General 
Services Administration rules under the Privacy Act of 1974); cf. 6 C.F.R. pt. 5, app. C (71) 
(2019); see also OMB MEMO, supra note 21, at 1 n.1 (including “biometric records” in the 
category of “personally identifiable information”). 
80 See, e.g., 2 C.F.R. § 200.79 (2019) (“PII means information that can be used to distinguish 
or trace an individual's identity, either alone or when combined with other personal or 
identifying information that is linked or linkable to a specific individual.”); 32 C.F.R. § 329.3 
(2019) (defining PII as “[i]nformation about an individual that identifies, links, relates, or is 
unique to, or describes him or her . . . [or] which can be used to distinguish or trace an 
individual's identity which is linked or linkable to a specified individual”). PII is the central 
concept upon which information privacy law rests. See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, 
The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1816 (2011). The United States’ sectoral approach to privacy law has 
generally focused on privacy protections of information that can be used to link information 
to a person’s identity. In turn, most federal privacy statutes protect narrowly defined classes 
of PII. See Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2) (2018) (“No 
funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or 
institution which has a policy or practice of releasing, or providing access to, any personally 
identifiable information in education records . . . .”); Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 
U.S.C. § 551(a)–(b) (requiring cable operators to provide consumers with notice regarding 
the PII collected and prohibiting collection of PII without prior written consent); Video 
Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1) (2018) (“A video tape service provider who 
knowingly discloses, to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any 
consumer of such provider shall be liable to the aggrieved person . . . .”); cf. Fair Credit 
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(1) (2018) (providing protections relating to “consumer 
reports,” which the statute defines as “any . . . communication of any information by a 
consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness . . . [or] personal 
characteristics” when used to establish the consumer’s eligibility for credit, insurance, or for 
other defined purposes). Despite PII’s central importance to information privacy, no 
uniform definition of the term exists in the United States. Shwartz & Solove, supra, at 1819. 
Moreover, the American concept of PII, and the law’s reliance on PII for protecting 
individuals’ privacy, has come under attack in recent years, as the digital era has proven that 
even non-PII can be de-anonymized and transformed into PII. See id. at 1816 (“Increasingly, 
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biometric identifiers, some of the most common examples of PII include a 
person’s name, social security number, date of birth, and address.81 
Ultimately, PII can be used to tie information relating to an otherwise 
anonymous individual to that individual’s identity.82 For example, an online 
retailer might have a record of a user’s transaction history. With that record 
alone, the retailer could not determine who made the purchases in question. 
But when the record is attached to an address, date of birth, social security 
number, or name, the retailer can readily determine the identity of the 
purchaser.83 
The value of PII increases demonstrably within the context of the data 
brokerage industry. While there is no statutory definition for the term “data 
brokers,”84 the Federal Trade Commission has defined the term as follows: 
“Data brokers are companies that collect information, including personal 
information about consumers, from a wide variety of sources for the 
purpose of reselling such information to their customers for various 
purposes, including verifying an individual’s identity, differentiating records, 
marketing products, and preventing financial fraud.”85 These entities often 
                                                           
technologists can take information that appears on its face to be non-identifiable and turn it 
into identifiable data.”); Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the 
Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1704 (2010) (“Today, this 
debate centers almost entirely on squabbles over magical phrases like ‘personally identifiable 
information’ (PII) or ‘personal data.’ Advances in reidentification expose how thoroughly 
these phrases miss the point.”). In response to a Federal Trade Commission call for 
comments on privacy issues associated with new technologies and business models, “several 
consumer and privacy groups elaborated on the privacy concerns associated with supposedly 
anonymous data and discussed the decreasing relevance of the personally identifiable 
information (‘PII’) label.” FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN 
ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 18 
(2012), https://bit.ly/3cD7Bhx [https://perma.cc/F6NX-DBK7] [hereinafter FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY]. 
81 See, e.g., 2 C.F.R. § 200.82 (2019); 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (2019); 6 C.F.R. § 37.3 (2019); 41 
C.F.R. § 105-64.001 (2019).  
82 Accord FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 80, at 18–
22. 
83 See Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16, 
2012), https://nyti.ms/2Wf1HfC [https://perma.cc/XRM6-9CUY] (discussing how Target’s 
“Guest ID” links an individual’s transaction history and demographic information to the 
individual’s identity). 
84 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI. & TRANSP., 113TH CONG., A REVIEW OF THE 
DATA BROKER INDUSTRY: COLLECTION, USE, AND SALE OF CONSUMER DATA FOR 
MARKETING PURPOSES 1 (2013) [hereinafter A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY]. 
85 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 80, at 68. Data 
brokers have operated for years. “Long before the advent of the Internet, e-mail, or the 
mobile economy, data brokers developed expertise in compiling consumer data to facilitate 
targeted outreach to consumers through direct mail.” A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER 
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operate in the shadows, with consumers unaware of the types of information 
being collected, the methods used to do so, and to whom it is sold.86 In fact, 
the scope of information that data brokers gather is quite broad, largely due 
to the decisions people now make using the Internet.87 Each day, “millions 
of consumers . . . [use] computers, smart phones, and tablets to make 
purchases, plan trips, and research personal financial and health questions, 
among other activities. These digitally recorded decisions provide insights 
into the consumer’s habits, preferences, and financial and health status.”88 
With consumers increasingly expanding their digital footprints and 
technological advances facilitating access to the information generated, data 
brokers have expanded the types of information they collect, store, and 
sell.89  
Data brokers’ customers range from financial lending institutions 
making credit decisions on a particular borrower to employers making 
hiring decisions to retailers determining how, and to whom, to target their 
advertising efforts.90 A New York Times Magazine profile on the data-
broker industry found that retailers can purchase a wide swath of 
information about consumer habits based on peoples’ online activities, 
including:  
data about your ethnicity, job history, the magazines you read, if 
you’ve ever declared bankruptcy or got divorced, the year you 
bought (or lost) your house, where you went to college, what 
kinds of topics you talk about online, whether you prefer certain 
brands of coffee, paper towels, cereal or applesauce, your 
political leanings, reading habits, charitable giving and the 
number of cars you own.91  
                                                           
INDUSTRY, supra note 84, at 1. However, the data broker industry has grown significantly in 
the wake of the digital era. Id. at 2. 
86 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 80, at 68. 
87 A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY, supra note 84, at 1–2. 
88 Id. at 2 (footnote omitted). 
89 See id. at 1–2; FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 80, at 
68. 
90 A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY, supra note 84, at i, 8. Data brokers have a 
wide range of customers. The types of customers include financial institutions, hotel chains, 
wireless telephone service providers, cable companies, jewelry stores, and other data brokers 
and resellers. Id. at 29. 
91 Duhigg, supra note 83. To aid this effort, data brokers offer “predictive scoring products” 
that predict a consumer’s behavior. Companies that purchase these products use them to 
“assess[] which customers will receive special offers, or [to] look[] at credit risks associated 
with certain mortgage applications.” A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY, supra note 
84, at 8. 
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Those retailers then analyze the data both to better market products to 
consumers and to predict how consumers will behave in the future.92 
The data collected and sold by data brokers would be meaningless 
without the links that PII provides. PII provides data brokers and interested 
data collectors with the identities behind online activities.93 A search query 
or online purchase may be linked to an IP address; that IP address is linked 
to a name, email address, or street address; and that name or address is 
linked to the consumer. Armed with this information, retailers can analyze 
the information connected to a consumer’s identity and then determine how 
to capitalize on what they know about that person. 
Biometrics exacerbates the concerns associated with these practices. 
Consider the Walmart patent application discussed above.94 Theoretically, 
Walmart could use the same technology to instantaneously determine each 
customer’s preferences by using facial biometrics to access the customer’s 
purchase history and then use that information to provide targeted ads or 
coupons at point of sale.95 Indeed, some retailers have already begun using 
facial recognition technology for that very purpose, surveilling and tracking 
consumers from the moment they walk into the store.96 And while social 
                                                           
92 Duhigg, supra note 83; see also A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY, supra note 
84, at 8, 12–13. This information is gathered from a range of data, including consumers’ 
purchase and transaction information and social-media activity. See A REVIEW OF THE DATA 
BROKER INDUSTRY, supra note 84, at 13–14. Data brokers gather this information from a 
range of sources, including “government records and other public data; purchase or license 
from other data collectors; cooperative agreements with other companies; self-report by 
consumers, often through surveys, questionnaires, and sweepstakes; and social media.” A 
REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY, supra note 84, at 15. 
93 See Duhigg, supra note 83. 
94 See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text. 
95 The Federal Trade Commission has raised similar concerns: 
In the future, digital signs and kiosks placed in supermarkets, transit stations, and college 
campuses could capture images of viewers and, through the use of facial recognition software, 
match those faces to online identities, and return advertisements based on the websites 
specific individuals have visited or the publicly available information contained in their social 
media profiles. Retailers could also implement loyalty programs, ask users to associate a 
photo with the account, then use the combined data to link the consumer to other online 
accounts or their in-store actions. This would enable the retailer to glean information about 
the consumer’s purchase habits, interests, and even movements, which could be used to offer 
discounts on particular products or otherwise market to the consumer. 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 80, at 45. 
96See Miranda, supra note 75; Nick Tabor, Smile! The Secretive Business of Facial-
Recognition Software in Retail Stores, INTELLIGENCER (Oct. 20, 2018), 
https://nym.ag/2Wgo709 [https://perma.cc/LD6L-TZWR]. Many retailers use this 
technology for security purposes. For instance, the facial recognition software in many retail 
stores captures images of customers’ faces and compares the scanned images against a 
database of known shoplifters. See Miranda, supra note 75. The cameras used to capture 
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security numbers can be changed, email accounts deleted, and birth records 
sealed, it is much more difficult, if not impossible, to discard and replace a 
person’s fingerprints, facial landmarks, or iris patterns. Biometrics can, 
therefore, provide the inescapable means by which private entities can trace 
limitless personal information back to a consumer in real time, regardless 
of whether the consumer knows it is happening. 
III. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
The right to privacy stands as a pillar of individual liberty that intersects 
with many distinct aspects of American jurisprudence. As a constitutional 
right, the right to privacy prohibits the government from unreasonably 
intruding into one’s private affairs.97 Outside the constitutional context, the 
right protects against private actors who encroach on one’s ability to be left 
alone. This section provides a brief overview of the right to privacy’s origins, 
the common-law tort claims that emerged therefrom, and the Supreme 
Court’s endeavors to parse Fourth Amendment privacy interests within the 
context of modern technology. 
A. Origins and Common Law Claims 
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published the seminal 
article The Right to Privacy,98 which has been widely credited as the catalyst 
for American privacy law.99 The article opens with an acknowledgement of 
                                                           
the images are not only the security cameras placed near ceilings but also cameras stored 
inside digital signs and kiosks. See Tabor, supra. The latter type of camera has been used to 
determine whether customers are paying attention to advertisements. Id. The advent of 
“smart shelves” may further the capabilities of this technology. Smart shelves are expected to 
replace current supermarket shelves and, more importantly, the labels that appear on them. 
Instead of the normal paper label containing information about a product’s price, smart 
shelves will be equipped with sensors that interact with customers’ mobile devices. See Lana 
Bandoim, How Smart Shelf Technology Will Change Your Supermarket, FORBES (Dec. 23, 
2018), https://bit.ly/2pPTkLv [https://perma.cc/X6U7-7G9G]. The technology will sift 
through the information associated with that individual—including his or her purchasing 
habits, Internet search history, and demographic information—and create personalized 
advertisements that immediately appear on a screen on the shelf. See id. It would not be far-
fetched to imagine smart-shelf technology employing facial recognition technology to 
perform the same tasks and, in turn, produce far more efficient and detailed results. 
97 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (identifying a constitutionally protected 
right to privacy). 
98 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
99 See Benjamin E. Bratman, Brandeis and Warren’s The Right to Privacy and the Birth of 
the Right to Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REV. 623 (2002) (crediting The Right to Privacy as the 
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the common law’s ability to progress and “grow[] to meet the demands of 
society.”100 Warren and Brandeis set forth several historic instances in which 
common-law rights have evolved with societal change to protect the 
underlying interests attached to those rights.101  
Citing “[r]ecent inventions and business methods,” Warren and 
Brandeis argued that recent societal developments necessitated new legal 
recognitions to preserve the “protection of the person”—namely, the 
recognition of the “right ‘to be left alone.’”102 The “right to privacy,” they 
argued, did not constitute a new right but rather an unspoken protection 
preserved by then-existing sources of law.103 And like most rights, they found, 
the right to privacy was not absolute.104 Warren and Brandeis outlined six 
limitations to the right, which included—importantly for this Article—the 
right’s cessation upon the rightholder’s publication of private facts or 
consent thereto.105 
The right to privacy quickly gained traction, with Georgia becoming 
the first state to recognize a common-law cause of action for invasion of 
privacy in 1905.106 Today, most states recognize four torts that collectively 
comprise the “invasion of privacy” cause of action:107 (1) intrusion upon 
                                                           
motivating force behind the recognition of the right to privacy by several state courts and state 
legislatures). 
100 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 98, at 193. 
101 Id. at 193–95. 
102 Id. at 195. 
103 Id. at 205–06. As Warren and Brandeis note: 
These considerations lead to the conclusion that the protection afforded to thoughts, 
sentiments, and emotions, expressed through the medium of writing or of the arts, so far as 
it consists in preventing publication, is merely an instance of the enforcement of the more 
general right of the individual to be let alone. It is like the right not to be assaulted or beaten, 
the right not to be imprisoned, the right not to be maliciously prosecuted, the right not to be 
defamed. In each of these rights, as indeed in all other rights recognized by the law, there 
inheres the quality of being owned or possessed—and (as that is the distinguishing attribute 
of property) there may be some propriety in speaking of those rights as property. But, 
obviously, they bear little resemblance to what is ordinarily comprehended under that term. 
The principle which protects personal writings and all other personal productions, not 
against theft and physical appropriation, but against publication in any form, is in reality not 
the principle of private property, but that of an inviolate personality. 
Id. at 205 (footnote omitted). 
104 See id. at 214 (contemplating limitations to the right to privacy). 
105 See id. at 218. 
106 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 12 (6th ed. 
2018); see also Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 81 (Ga. 1905) (“So 
thoroughly satisfied are we that the law recognizes within proper limits, as a legal right, the 
right of privacy . . . that we venture to predict that the day will come when the American bar 
will marvel that a contrary view was ever entertained . . . .”). 
107 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 106, at 28. 
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seclusion;108 (2) public disclosure of private facts;109 (3) false light;110 and (4) 
appropriation of name or likeness.111 Scholars attribute this four-tort 
conception to William Prosser,112 whose article Privacy113 provided the first 
attempt to describe invasion of privacy in tort law. In Prosser’s view, which 
later informed the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ approach,114 privacy torts 
protect against a narrow class of harm that includes mental harm and 
distress,115 reputational harm,116 and proprietary harm.117  
Prosser’s four-tort conception persists today, as courts continue to limit 
their recognition of privacy-tort claims to the four torts enumerated in 
Prosser’s article and the narrow interests those torts purportedly protect.118 
Some scholars argue that this limited approach to the right to privacy has 
lost touch with the times,119 explaining that such a confined view of the 
protected interests fails to account for modern technology and therefore 
leaves many injuries unremedied.120 
B. Privacy and the Constitution 
1. Early Foundations: Griswold v. Connecticut 
While the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly reference a right to 
privacy, the Supreme Court has nevertheless found the right’s subsistence 
through other constitutional guarantees. Griswold v. Connecticut121 marked 
the Court’s first express recognition of a constitutionally protected privacy 
                                                           
108 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
109 See id. § 652D. 
110 See id. § 652E. 
111 See id. § 652C. 
112 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 
1809 (2010). 
113 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).  
114 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652C–652E. 
115 See Prosser, supra note 113, at 392 (concluding intrusion upon seclusion protects a 
“mental” interest). 
116 See id. at 398 (finding the public disclosure of private facts tort protects “reputation” 
interests); see also id. at 400 (positing the false light tort protects “reputation” interests). 
117 See id. at 406 (concluding the tort of appropriation protects “proprietary” interests more 
than “mental” interests). 
118 Citron, supra note 112, at 1824 (“Prosser’s privacy taxonomy now permeates case law.”). 
For a discussion of the elements comprising the appropriation of name or likeness tort, see 
infra Section III.A.1. 
119 See Citron, supra note 112, at 1824–31. 
120 See id. 
121 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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right.122 Griswold involved a state law that criminalized both the use and 
prescription of contraception methods.123 The Court, by a 7-to-2 vote, 
invalidated the law on the grounds that the law unconstitutionally intruded 
on the “privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”124 Writing for the 
majority, Justice Douglas explained that although the Constitution does not 
explicitly protect an individual’s privacy, the express protections contained 
in the Bill of Rights create “zones of privacy” that are necessary to ensure 
the Constitution’s explicit protections.125 The First Amendment, Justice 
Douglas explained, protects privacy in group association; the Third 
Amendment in one’s home; the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination 
Clause in one’s personal information.126 Justice Douglas also observed the 
protections contained in the Fourth Amendment, suggesting a right to 
privacy in one’s person, houses, papers, and effects;127 and in the Ninth 
Amendment, suggesting privacy protections in areas not specifically 
addressed in the other amendments.128 
2. Katz and Its Progeny 
a. The Reasonable-Expectation-of-Privacy Test 
The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence provides the 
most robust probe into the constitutional protections of privacy rights. Two 
years after Griswold, the Court decided Katz v. United States,129 which set 
forth the modern test for analyzing the Fourth Amendment’s applicability 
to privacy interests. The “reasonable expectation of privacy test,” articulated 
in Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion, provides the standard by which 
                                                           
122 See Arthur E. Brooks, Doe and Dronenburg: Sodomy Statutes Are Constitutional, 26 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 645, 662 (1985) (noting Griswold was the “first major privacy 
decision.”). 
123 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480. 
124 Id. at 485–86 (“Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital 
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the 
notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”). 
125 Id. at 484 (“[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by 
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees 
create zones of privacy.” (citation omitted)). 
126 Id.  
127 Id. In pertinent part, the Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
128 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. The Ninth Amendment provides: “The enumeration in the 
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by 
the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
129 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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courts determine whether a “search” occurred within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.130 Under the test, a search occurs when the government 
violates a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”131 A violation occurs 
if: (1) the person had an “actual (subjective) expectation of privacy”; and (2) 
the expectation is “one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”132 Thus, a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy is 
determined by a combination of subjective and objective inquiries. 
Since Katz, the Court has routinely applied the reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test to determine the Fourth Amendment’s 
applicability to government conduct. On the one hand, the Court has found 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s home133 and its curtilage;134 a 
lawfully possessed rental vehicle;135 the contents of a passenger bag136 or 
suitcase;137 the results of a diagnostic urine sample;138 and the contents of 
films.139 On the other hand, the Court has found no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in a vehicle in which a person has no ownership or possessory 
                                                           
130 See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (setting forth a two-prong test for assessing the Fourth 
Amendment’s application). 
131 See id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I join the opinion of the Court, which I read to 
hold only . . . that an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home and unlike a 
field, a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy . . . .” 
(citations omitted)). 
132 Id. at 361.  
133 Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213–14 (1981) (holding the Fourth Amendment 
requires a judicial determination of probable cause before police may search a home without 
a search warrant); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) (stating the zone of privacy 
is most clearly defined by the “unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s home”). 
134 Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2013) (“We therefore regard the area ‘immediately 
surrounding and associated with the home’—what our cases call the curtilage—as ‘part of the 
home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.’” (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 
170, 180 (1984))). 
135 Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1524 (2018) (holding as a general rule a person in 
lawful possession of a rental car has a reasonable expectation of privacy even if that person 
is not listed on the rental agreement).  
136 Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 339 (2000) (holding the Fourth Amendment protects 
a traveler’s carry-on bag from unreasonable physical manipulation). 
137 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 766 (1979) (holding the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement applies to personal luggage taken from a vehicle). 
138 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001) (“The reasonable expectation of 
privacy enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is that the 
results of those tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel without her consent.”). 
139 Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 654 (1980) (“[T]he unauthorized exhibition of the 
films constituted an unreasonable invasion of their owner's constitutionally protected interest 
in privacy.”). 
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interest;140 the numbers dialed from a telephone;141 open fields;142 plainly 
observable areas of one’s yard, including those observable by aerial 
surveillance;143 and trash left for collection.144  
b. The Third-Party Doctrine 
Under the “third-party doctrine,” individuals possess no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information they voluntarily convey to a third party, 
“even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used 
only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will 
not be betrayed.”145 In United States v. Miller,146 the Court held that a bank 
depositor did not maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in financial 
information voluntarily conveyed to a bank in the ordinary course of 
business.147 The Court found that because the depositor assumed the risk 
that the bank would reveal his information to the Government, he could not 
reasonably expect that information to remain private.148  
The Court reaffirmed its holding in Miller three years later in Smith v. 
Maryland,149 where the Court found a person had no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed because he voluntarily conveyed 
those numbers to the phone company by using the phone. Citing Miller, 
the Court in Smith found the defendant assumed the risk that the telephone 
company would reveal the call-log information to the police.150 The Court 
found that the defendant’s privacy claim fell flat under the objective prong 
                                                           
140 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148–49 (1978) (holding Petitioners’ claims failed because 
they “made no showing that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove 
compartment or area under the seat of the car in which they were merely passengers”). 
141 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (stating a person has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties). 
142 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (“[A]n individual may not legitimately 
demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately 
surrounding the home.”). 
143 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–51 (1989) (holding the Fourth Amendment was not 
violated when police view from an aircraft revealed marijuana growing on the defendant’s 
property); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (holding the Fourth Amendment 
does not require law enforcement traveling in public airways to get a warrant to see what is 
visible with the naked eye). 
144 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988) (stating exposing garbage to the public 
by placing it on the curb defeats any Fourth Amendment protection). 
145 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976); see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–46. 
146 Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 443. 
149 Smith, 442 U.S. at 744–75. 
150 Id. 
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of the Katz test because, in part, the public knows the telephone company’s 
facilities are capable of tracking and storing the phone numbers a person 
dials.151 
3. Fourth Amendment Privacy and Advancements in Technology 
In recent years, rapid advancements in technology have challenged the 
Fourth Amendment’s precepts. Certain technological advancements 
provide new means for collecting and storing information; others make new 
types of information available. Accordingly, the Court has been forced to 
grapple with privacy concerns implicated in not only the methods of 
collection but also the types of information collected. This section briefly 
overviews three cases in which the Court was forced to confront these issues. 
a. Maryland v. King  
In Maryland v. King,152 the Court held that using a cheek swab to take 
and analyze an arrestee’s DNA for identification purposes following a lawful 
arrest does not violate the Fourth Amendment.153 While the Court 
acknowledged that using a cheek swab to obtain a DNA sample constitutes 
a search,154 the Court found that the circumstances of the case—namely, the 
swab was conducted incident to arrest and the sample was used strictly for 
identification purposes—rendered the search reasonable.155 Importantly, the 
Court acknowledged that the lawfulness of performing such a search on the 
average citizen fell outside the scope of the Court’s opinion “because unlike 
the search of a citizen who has not been suspected of a wrong, a detainee 
has a reduced expectation of privacy.”156 
The Court paid little attention to the type of information gathered but 
instead focused on the method by which the police gathered the DNA 
information.157 The Court observed that the cheek swab at issue “involve[d] 
                                                           
151 Id. at 742 (“All subscribers realize, moreover, that the phone company has facilities for 
making permanent records of the numbers they dial”). 
152 Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013). 
153 See id. at 465–66 (“When officers make an arrest supported by probable cause . . . , taking 
and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, 
a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”). 
154 See id. at 446 (“It can be agreed that using a buccal swab on the inner tissues of a person’s 
cheek in order to obtain DNA samples is a search.”). 
155 See id. at 461–65. The Fourth Amendment only protects against “unreasonable searches 
and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
156 King, 569 U.S. at 463. 
157 See id. at 463–64 (“[A] buccal swab involves an even more brief and still minimal intrusion. 
A gentle rub along the inside of the cheek does not break the skin, and it ‘involves virtually 
no risk, trauma, or pain.’”). 
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an even more brief and still minimal intrusion” than other approved 
incident-to-arrest search procedures.158 While the Court acknowledged early 
in the opinion that DNA samples can reveal significant information about a 
person,159 it found the Maryland statute, which authorized such searches, 
provided adequate safeguards against police misuse such that the authorized 
procedures did “not amount to a significant invasion of privacy.”160 
b. Birchfield v. North Dakota  
Issues of privacy and the Government’s use of technology confronted 
the Court again in 2016. Birchfield v. North Dakota161 asked the Court to 
decide whether so-called “implied consent laws” violated the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches.162 In an effort to 
combat drunk driving, states enacted implied consent laws requiring drivers 
suspected of drunk driving to submit to blood-alcohol-concentration (BAC) 
tests.163 These laws provide that drivers impliedly consent to BAC testing by 
driving on public roads.164 The laws at issue in Birchfield, however, made it 
a crime to refuse to submit to a BAC test after being lawfully arrested for 
impaired driving.165 
Birchfield involved three separate cases of individuals from different 
states who refused to submit to BAC testing. The disposition of each case 
turned on the type of BAC testing at issue: breath test or blood draw. In the 
case of Danny Birchfield, Birchfield was criminally prosecuted under North 
Dakota law for, and ultimately pleaded guilty to, refusing to submit to a 
blood draw following his arrest for driving while impaired.166 Robert 
Bernard, Jr. was criminally prosecuted under Minnesota law for refusing to 
                                                           
158 Id. at 463–64. 
159 Id. at 442–43. 
160 Id. at 464–65. Specifically, the Court referenced statutory language that barred government 
officials from using the DNA samples “‘for information that does not relate to the 
identification of individuals.’” Id. at 465 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-512(c) 
(LexisNexis 2019)). The Court also noted earlier in the decision that the statute also prohibits 
“[t]ests for familial matches.” Id. at 444 (citing MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-506(d) 
(LexisNexis 2019)). 
161 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016). 
162 Id. at 2166–67. 
163 Id. 
164 See Robert B. Voas et al., Implied-Consent Laws: A Review of the Literature and 
Examination of Current Problems and Related Statutes, 40 J. SAFETY RES. 77, 79 (2009) 
(“[I]mplied-consent laws [are] based on the principle that driving is a privilege, not a right, 
and in accepting a drivers license, an individual is deemed to have given consent to a chemical 
test.” (citation omitted)). 
165 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2170–72. 
166 Id. at 2170–71. 
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submit to a breath test following his arrest for driving under the influence, 
but the state trial court dismissed the charge, finding the Fourth 
Amendment prohibited the warrantless breath test.167 Finally, Steve Michael 
Beylund’s driver’s license was suspended in an administrative proceeding 
after he submitted to a blood test.168 Beylund’s submission to the blood test 
came after a police officer told Beylund that North Dakota law required his 
submission.169 The North Dakota Supreme Court found Beylund 
voluntarily consented to the blood draw and therefore affirmed the 
suspension.170 
Because the testing in each case occurred after a lawful arrest, the 
Court constructed its analytical framework around the “search-incident-to-
arrest” doctrine,171 which categorically permits police officers to search, 
without a warrant, the person and surrounding area of an arrestee following 
a lawful arrest.172 The justification for the exception to the warrant 
requirement is based on officer safety and preservation of evidence.173 After 
canvassing the history of the exception, the Court acknowledged that BAC 
testing, while not an entirely “new” phenomenon, was not contemplated in 
the Founding era; accordingly, the Court examined the specific BAC testing 
methods at issue, balancing the “degree to which it intrudes upon an 
individual’s privacy and . . . the degree to which it is needed for the 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”174 
i. Breath Test 
The Court found binding precedent permitted the breath tests, stating, 
“Years ago we said that breath tests do not ‘implicat[e] significant privacy 
concerns.’ That remains so today.”175 Acknowledging the diminished 
                                                           
167 Id. at 2171. 
168 Id. at 2171–72. 
169 Id. at 2172. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 2174 (“In the three cases now before us, the drivers were searched or told that they 
were required to submit to a search after being placed under arrest for drunk driving. We 
therefore consider how the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine applies to breath and blood 
tests incident to such arrests.”). 
172 See id. at 2179 (“[T]he legality of a search incident to arrest must be judged on the basis 
of categorical rules.”). 
173 See id. at 2176 (“The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, 
while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a 
court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation . . . .” (quoting 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 235 (1973))). 
174 Id. at 2174–76 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)). 
175 Id. at 2176 (quoting Skinner v. R Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989)) 
(citation omitted). 
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expectation of privacy one holds following an arrest,176 the Court based its 
reasoning on three grounds. First, breath tests do not involve significant 
physical intrusion. The breath test at issue in Bernard’s case, the Court 
explained, lasted for a short time and involved no pain.177 And while the 
breath test required a sample of “deep lung” air,178 the Court found that 
humans have never asserted a “possessory interest in or any emotional 
attachment to any of the air in their lungs.”179 
Second, the Court found that breath tests reveal only negligible 
information about the test’s subject. Contrasting the information obtained 
through breath tests in this case—“the amount of alcohol in the subject’s 
breath”180—with the information obtained through the cheek swab in King—
the subject’s DNA—the Court found that breath tests involve only minimal 
revelations about persons subjected to such tests.181 Importantly, however, 
this comparison seemingly reinforces the narrowness of the holding in King: 
post-arrest cheek swabs, for identification purposes only, do not run afoul 
of the Fourth Amendment.182 
Finally, the Court found that breath tests do not exacerbate the 
inherent embarrassment of an arrest. Noting that breath tests are usually 
administered in “private,” the Court found blowing into a straw for several 
seconds is not inherently embarrassing.183 
 
Following an assessment of the Government’s interest in public safety, 
the Court ultimately concluded that the Fourth Amendment does not 
                                                           
176 See id. at 2177 (“Moreover, once placed under arrest, the individual’s expectation of 
privacy is necessarily diminished.”). 
177 Id. 
178 Typically, there is more alcohol present in the deeper portions of the lungs (i.e., the 
“alveolar sacs”) than in other portions of the lung. See State v. Brayman, 751 P.2d 294, 297 
(Wash. 1988). Thus, most breath test machines are designed to test the last portion of a 
person’s breath. Id. 
179 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2177. 
180 Id. 
181 Id.  
182 See id. The Court explained: 
[Breath tests] contrast sharply with the sample of cells collected by the swab in Maryland v. 
King. Although the DNA obtained under the law at issue in that case could lawfully be used 
only for identification purposes, the process put into the possession of law enforcement 
authorities a sample from which a wealth of additional, highly personal information could 
potentially be obtained. A breath test, by contrast, results in a BAC reading on a machine, 
nothing more. No sample of anything is left in the possession of the police. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
183 See id. 
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require police to obtain a warrant before conducting a breath test incident 
to arrest.184 
ii. Blood Draw 
The Court found important distinctions between blood draws and 
breath tests that rendered warrantless blood draws unreasonable. 
Examining blood-draw procedures, the court found that blood draws 
implicate significant privacy interests for two reasons. First, unlike breath 
tests, blood draws require a physical intrusion into the subject’s body by 
piercing of the skin.185 Second, and unlike the finding in King, the Court 
found the potential for misuse raised grave concerns.186 Specifically, the 
Court found that preserved blood samples can reveal information about a 
person beyond the levels of alcohol contained in the subject’s blood.187 And 
even if police were precluded from using the sample for other purposes, the 
Court noted, “the potential [for misuse] remains and may result in anxiety 
for the person tested.”188 
On balance, the Court found, the privacy interests at stake in blood-
draw cases outweigh states’ interests in public safety.189 Thus, the Court 
concluded, a warrantless blood draw performed incident to arrest violates 
the Fourth Amendment.190 
c. Carpenter v. United States 
The Court’s most recent opportunity to address modern technology’s 
implications on Fourth Amendment privacy arose in Carpenter v. United 
States.191 In June 2018, the Court issued its decision in Carpenter, which 
held that “an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
record of his physical movements as captured through” cell-site location 
information (CSLI).192 CSLI refers to time-stamped location records 
                                                           
184 See id. at 2184. 
185 See id. at 2178. 
186 See id. 
187 See id.  
188 Id. 
189 See id. at 2184–85. 
190 See id. 
191 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
192 See id. at 2217. While the plain words of the Court’s express holding appeared to establish 
significant, broad-sweeping precedential value, see id., the majority seemed to leave room 
for scaling back some of the decision’s most important protections by peppering its opinion 
with qualifying statements. For instance, while the Court’s broad statement suggests that 
warrantless government access to an individual’s CSLI constitutes a search, the Court 
included a footnote suggesting that its holding was limited to the seven days of CSLI gathered 
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generated from a cell phone’s communications with nearby cell towers.193 As 
the Court in Carpenter explained: 
Cell phones continuously scan their environment looking for the 
best signal, which generally comes from the closest cell site. Most 
modern devices, such as smartphones, tap into the wireless 
network several times a minute whenever their signal is on, even 
if the owner is not using one of the phone’s features. Each time 
the phone connects to a cell site, it generates time-stamped 
records known as [CSLI].194 
The petitioner in Carpenter—Timothy Carpenter—was arrested and 
convicted on five firearm counts in connection with a series of robberies 
after a suspect identified Carpenter as an accomplice.195 Based on the 
information provided by the suspect, prosecutors applied for court orders 
under the Stored Communications Act196 to compel Carpenter’s wireless 
carriers to disclose CSLI linked to Carpenter’s phone during the four-
month period in which the robberies occurred.197 After obtaining the orders, 
prosecutors obtained CSLI records from Carpenter’s wireless carriers 
covering one-hundred and twenty-seven days of Carpenter’s location 
information and disclosing nearly 13,000 location points cataloging 
                                                           
by police in that case. See id. at 2217 n.3 (“It is sufficient for our purposes today to hold that 
accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.”). In fact, despite the 
sweeping language of the Court’s holding, the Court later described its decision as “a narrow 
one” and limited its application to historical—as opposed to real-time—CSLI. See id. at 2220. 
193 See Cell Site Location Information, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., (Mar. 28, 2019), 
https://bit.ly/2B89YZi [https://perma.cc/SCZ2-34QV]. CSLI is the information that cell 
phones convey to nearby cell towers. Id. Cell phones constantly search for nearby cell towers 
in order to locate the tower providing the strongest signal. Id. The tower with the strongest 
signal provides the cell phone with the fastest service. Id. When the cell phone connects to 
a tower, the person’s wireless provider records the time and duration of the connection. Id. 
Wireless providers store two types of CSLI: historical and prospective. Id. Historical CSLI 
is used to track a person’s past movements. Id. Prospective CSLI allows for tracking in real 
time. Id. The Court in Carpenter addressed the use of historical CSLI and expressly refused 
to address the propriety of prospective CSLI. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (“We do 
not express a view on matters not before us: real-time CSLI or ‘tower dumps’ . . . .”). 
194 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211. 
195 Id. at 2212–13. 
196 Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2018). The Stored 
Communications Act (SCA) permits the Government “to compel the disclosure of certain 
telecommunications records when it ‘offers specific and articulable facts showing that there 
are reasonable grounds to believe’ that the records sought ‘are relevant and material to an 
ongoing criminal investigation.’” Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)). 
Thus, in order to obtain an order to compel those records under the SCA, the Government 
need not satisfy the same requirements for obtaining a warrant—specifically, the requirement 
of probable cause. 
197 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212. 
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Carpenter’s movements.198 Carpenter moved to suppress the CSLI prior to 
trial, but the district court denied his motion.199 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s ruling, holding Carpenter lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his location information.200 The Sixth Circuit found the third-party 
doctrine rendered Carpenter’s expectation of privacy in his movements 
unreasonable because Carpenter had voluntarily conveyed his location 
information to his wireless carriers in the ordinary course of business.201 
Citing Smith v. Maryland,202 the Sixth Circuit concluded that Carpenter’s 
CSLI constituted voluntarily disclosed business records not entitled to 
Fourth Amendment protection.203 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Carpenter opened with an 
observation of the pervasiveness of cell phones in modern America and the 
near-constant stream of data sent to wireless carriers, “even if the owner is 
not using one of the phone’s features.”204 The Court noted that “[w]ireless 
carriers collect and store CSLI” primarily for business purposes, but the 
Court also acknowledged “wireless carriers often sell aggregated location 
records to data brokers, without individual identifying information of the 
sort at issue here.”205 Recent advancements in technology, the Court 
observed, have made it possible for “modern cell phones [to] generate 
increasingly vast amounts of increasingly precise CSLI.”206 
After surveying the Fourth Amendment’s history and its guiding 
principles,207 the Court found the expectation of privacy in one’s CSLI lies 
“at the intersection of two lines of cases”: (1) those addressing the 
expectation of privacy in one’s physical location and movements; and (2) 
                                                           
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 2213. 
201 Id. For a discussion of the third-party doctrine, see supra Section II.B.2.b. 
202 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). For a brief discussion of Smith v. Maryland, 
which reaffirmed the third-party doctrine’s general precepts, see supra Section II.B.2.b. 
203 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212. 
204 Id. at 2211. 
205 Id. at 2212 (emphasis added). 
206 Id. 
207 In particular, the Court acknowledged two “basic guideposts” that applied to the case in 
Carpenter. First, the Court noted, the Fourth Amendment “seeks to secure ‘the privacies of 
life’ against ‘arbitrary power.’” Id. at 2214 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 
(1886)). The Court then noted that “a central aim of the Framers was ‘to place obstacles in 
the way of a too permeating police surveillance.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 
U.S. 581, 595 (1948)). For further implications of the Court’s survey of the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, see infra Section II.B.3.d. 
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those in which the Court applied the third-party doctrine.208 Ultimately, these 
two lines of cases formed the path to the Court’s holding in Carpenter. 
i. Distinctions from Public Movement Cases 
The CSLI technology in Carpenter presented the Court with unique 
circumstances that fit somewhere between the two poles of the first line of 
cases. On the one hand, the Court explained, the Court previously held that 
people do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their travels on 
public roads, even when law enforcement uses “augmented” visual 
surveillance.209 In United States v. Knotts,210 the Court held that a search did 
not occur when police planted a beeper in a container carried on the 
defendant’s vehicle and used the beeper’s signal to track the defendant to 
his final destination.211 The Court in Knotts focused not on the use of the 
monitoring technology but rather on the defendant’s use of public roads.212 
The Court in Knotts found that the use of technology to augment the 
“sensory faculties bestowed upon [officers] at birth” does not constitute a 
search when the police could have otherwise lawfully monitored the 
suspect’s movements without the technology.213  
On the other hand, the Court in Carpenter noted, the Court has also 
held that planting a GPS tracking device on the undercarriage of a person’s 
vehicle and using the GPS to conduct surveillance constitutes a search.214 In 
United States v. Jones,215 the Court found that such use of technology 
constitutes a search, but it did not reach this conclusion based on the 
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Instead, the Court in Jones 
found that a search occurred because the police had physically trespassed 
onto the person’s property when they placed the device on the vehicle’s 
undercarriage.216 Because the police carried out the trespass for the purpose 
of monitoring the defendant’s movements, a search had occurred.217  
                                                           
208 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214–15. 
209 Id. at 2215 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280–81 (1983)). 
210 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
211 See id. at 282–85. 
212 See id. at 282 (“Visual surveillance from public places . . . would have sufficed to reveal all 
[relevant] facts to the police. The fact that the officers in this case relied not only on visual 
surveillance, but also on the use of the beeper . . . does not alter the situation.”). 
213 Id. 
214 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 
(2012)). 
215 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
216 Id. at 404–05. 
217 Id. 
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The Court in Carpenter ultimately noted that, much like the GPS 
monitoring in Jones, CSLI is “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly 
compiled.”218 But the Carpenter Court found that CSLI produced far more 
information about the subject of the search than the GPS monitoring in 
Jones. Focusing heavily on the technology’s ability to “achieve near perfect 
surveillance,” the Court observed two interconnected aspects of the 
technology: (1) its precision; and (2) the breadth of information it can reveal 
about a person.219 The Court noted that cell phones have become “almost a 
‘feature of human anatomy,’” tracking “nearly exactly the movements of its 
owners.”220 Unlike the beeper in Knotts or the GPS in Jones, the Court 
explained, cell phones follow their owners beyond public roads and into 
areas of life that historically have been deemed private, such as homes, 
doctors’ offices, and political headquarters.221 The Court further noted that 
CSLI’s precision has rapidly improved in recent years, now enabling 
wireless carriers to identify users’ locations with increasing accuracy.222 
Importantly, the Court expressed significant concern regarding future 
advancements in CSLI technology and how those advancements could lead 
to increasingly more accurate surveillance.223 
With respect to the breadth of the information, the Court noted that 
CSLI’s ability to calculate a phone’s location implicates privacy concerns 
that strike at the core of the Fourth Amendment’s protections.224 The places 
that a person visits, the Court explained, can reveal significant details about 
that person, including “not only [a person’s] particular movements, but 
through them [his or her] ‘familial, political, professional, religious, and 
sexual associations.’”225 These associations, the Court noted, have been 
                                                           
218 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216. 
219 Id. at 2217–18. 
220 Id. at 2218. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 2218–19 (“[T]he rule the Court adopts ‘must take account of more sophisticated 
systems that are already in use or in development.’” (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 
27, 36 (2001))). 
223 See id. at 2219. Specifically, the Court noted: 
While the records in this case reflect the state of technology at the start of the decade, the 
accuracy of CSLI is rapidly approaching GPS-level precision. As the number of cell sites has 
proliferated, the geographic area covered by each cell sector has shrunk, particularly in urban 
areas. In addition, with new technology measuring the time and angle of signals hitting their 
towers, wireless carriers already have the capability to pinpoint a phone’s location within 50 
meters. 
Id. 
224 See id. at 2217–18 (“Mapping a cell phone’s location over the course of 127 days provides 
an all-encompassing record of the holder’s whereabouts.” (emphasis added)). 
225 Id. at 2217. 
33
Slobom: Consent, Appropriation by Manipulation, and the 10-Year Challenge
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2020
1184 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:5 
characterized as the “privacies of life.”226 And because cell phones travel with 
a person nearly everywhere he or she goes, while generating increasingly 
more accurate information, CSLI data provides an “intimate window into a 
person’s life” that directly implicates the expectations of privacy, which the 
drafters of the Fourth Amendment sought to protect.227 
ii. Carpenter’s Application of the Third-Party Doctrine 
The third-party doctrine’s application to the CSLI in Carpenter 
presented somewhat of a square peg/round hole dilemma.228 The 
Government in Carpenter argued that even though a person might have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her movements when surveilled 
by GPS monitoring, CSLI data falls within the ambit of the third-party 
doctrine because the data amounted to business records obtained by 
wireless carriers.229 While Justice Kennedy agreed with the Government’s 
position,230 the majority did not.  
At face value, the third-party doctrine, as it existed pre-Carpenter, 
arguably encompassed CSLI: third-party businesses collected the data; 
Carpenter knowingly shared the data with those third parties; and Carpenter 
arguably shared the data voluntarily pursuant to the wireless carriers’ terms-
of-service agreements.231 For the majority, however, that position “fail[ed] to 
contend with the seismic shifts in digital technology that made possible the 
tracking of not only Carpenter’s location but also everyone else’s, not for a 
short period of time but for years and years.”232  
In what some have deemed a “carve out” to the third-party doctrine,233 
the Court found that the CSLI data in Carpenter, unlike the bank records 
                                                           
226 Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014)). 
227 Id. at 2217–19. 
228 See Jordan M. Blanke, Carpenter v. United States Begs for Action, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 
260, 260 (2018). 
229 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219. 
230 See id. at 2226–30 (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
231 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court consistently has held 
that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over 
to third parties.”) (discussing the third-party doctrine). 
232 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219. 
233 See Trevor Burrus & James Knight, Katz Nipped and Katz Cradled: Carpenter and the 
Evolving Fourth Amendment, 17 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 79, 87 (2018) (“[I]nstead of 
reassessing the Court’s entire Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to judge whether this 
deviation is justified, [Chief Justice] Roberts carved out a special ‘cell phone exception.’”); 
Daniel Solove, Carpenter v. United States, Cell Phone Location Records, and the Third 
Party Doctrine, TEACHPRIVACY: PRIVACY + SECURITY BLOG (July 1, 2018), 
https://bit.ly/37AzFR2 [https://perma.cc/J7QA-BUMN] (“The Supreme Court should have 
overruled the Third Party Doctrine or at least carved out a greater chunk of it.”). 
34
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 5
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol46/iss5/5
2020] 10-YEAR CHALLENGE  1185 
in Miller234 or the phone records in Smith,235 presented unique concerns that 
triggered the Fourth Amendment’s protections.236 First, the Court noted that 
the sheer scope of information collected through CSLI implicates concerns 
not previously addressed by the Court’s third-party-doctrine cases.237 The 
aggregated CSLI data acquired by police in Carpenter provided an 
“exhaustive chronicle” of Carpenter’s location information.238 Moreover, the 
Court noted, the information collected in previous third-party-doctrine 
cases had inherent limitations.239 For instance, the telephone call logs in 
Smith “reveal[ed] little in the way of ‘identifying information,’” and the bank 
deposits in Miller were “‘not confidential communications but negotiable 
instruments to be used in commercial transactions.’”240 In both cases, the 
Carpenter Court explained, the information obtained from third parties did 
not implicate highly sensitive information about who a person is.241 CSLI 
data, on the other hand, provides a “detailed chronicle of a person’s physical 
presence compiled every day, every moment, over several years.”242 
The Court also found that cell phone users do not “voluntarily” expose 
their CSLI to wireless carriers, as would be required for the third-party 
doctrine to apply.243 In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted two 
important aspects of the technology at issue. First, the Court noted again 
that cell phones have become such a pervasive force in modern life that 
carrying one is now a near-necessity.244 Second, the Court noted that cell 
phones share their users’ location information without any affirmative act 
on the part of the user.245 Users begin sharing their location information with 
wireless companies from the moment they turn on their phones.246 For the 
                                                           
234 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
235 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). For further discussion of the third-party 
doctrine, including its application in Miller and Smith, see supra Section II.B.2.b. 
236 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219–20. 
237 Id. at 2219. 
238 Id.  
239 See id. at 2219–20. 
240 Id. at 2219. 
241 See id. at 2219–20. 
242 Id. at 2220. 
243 See id. 
244 Id. (“[C]ell phones and the services they provide are ‘such a pervasive and insistent part of 
daily life’ that carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern society.” (quoting 
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 383 (2014))). 
245 Id. (“[A] cell phone logs a cell-sit record by dint of its operation, without any affirmative 
act on the part of the user beyond powering up.”). 
246 Id. 
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Court, this dynamic rendered the sharing of CSLI an involuntary act.247 
Based on these key distinctions, the Court declared its unwillingness to 




d. Fourth Amendment Privacy and Advancements in Technology 
Redux 
As the forgoing Fourth Amendment cases demonstrate, privacy 
interests extend beyond the common law and technology has created 
serious implications for historic notions of privacy. But the value of those 
cases is limited to the context in which they arose—namely, Fourth 
Amendment challenges. Accordingly, the question facing the Court was not 
necessarily whether an invasion of privacy occurred but rather whether the 
government intruded on a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy and, 
if so, whether the intrusion was unreasonable. 
While the Court in King held that Maryland’s cheek swab practices 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment, it did not find that individuals 
possess no privacy interests in their DNA.249 In fact, by deeming the cheek 
swab a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, the Court necessarily 
concluded that the Government’s use of a cheek swab intrudes upon a 
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.250 Similarly, while the court in 
Birchfield found that “breath tests do not ‘implicat[e] significant privacy 
concerns,’”251 it did not find that breath-test procedures do not implicate 
privacy interests at all.252 
                                                           
247 Id. (“Apart from disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no way to avoid 
leaving behind a trail of location data. As a result, in no meaningful sense does the user 
voluntarily ‘assume the risk’ of turning over a comprehensive dossier of his physical 
movements.” (brackets omitted) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979))). 
248 Id. 
249 See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 461–66 (2013) (finding while a person maintains a 
privacy interest in his or her DNA, an incident-to-arrest DNA swab does not unreasonably 
intrude on that interest). 
250 See id. at 446 (“It can be agreed that using a buccal swab on the inner tissues of a person’s 
cheek in order to obtain DNA samples is a search.”). 
251 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2176 (2016) (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor 
Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989)) (emphasis added). 
252 See id. at 2184. Notably, the Court’s analysis of the breath test assumed that a search had 
in fact occurred since the question presented was whether a breath test administered incident 
to arrest was reasonable. See id. at 2174 (“In the three cases now before us, the drivers were 
searched or told that they were required to submit to a search after being placed under arrest 
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A deeper look into the holdings in King and Birchfield suggests that 
the Court’s treatment of privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment 
turns not only on the extent to which the Government physically intrudes 
on an individual’s person but also on (1) the type of information obtained 
and limitations thereon as well as (2) the scope of information available. The 
apparent narrowness of the Court’s holding in King253 resulted from the 
limitations that Maryland imposed on police officers’ use of the 
information—specifically, the officers were limited to using the DNA for 
identification purposes only.254 Presumably, then, the Court in Birchfield 
could have found blood draws for the limited purpose of measuring a 
person’s BAC proper. Admittedly, the Court’s refusal to establish such a 
rule could have resulted from the physically intrusive nature of blood draw 
procedures.255 But the Court’s analysis in Birchfield did not stop at the 
physical intrusion. Instead, the Court went on to state:  
[A] blood test, unlike a breath test, places in the hands of law 
enforcement authorities a sample that can be preserved and from 
which it is possible to extract information beyond a simple BAC 
reading. Even if the law enforcement agency is precluded from 
testing the blood for any purpose other than to measure BAC, 
the potential remains and may result in anxiety for the person 
tested.256 
The Court’s statement suggests two concerns. First, by invoking the 
potential for misuse, the Court seemingly factors into its analysis the 
information attainable through a blood sample. A blood sample can reveal 
significantly more information about a person than a cheek swab.257 By 
removing from police the ability to obtain such information, the Court’s 
decision suggests a distrust of government maintenance of such broadly 
applicable information absent in King.  
                                                           
for drunk driving. We therefore consider how the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine applies 
to breath and blood tests incident to such arrests.”). 
253 See supra Section II.B.3.a (discussing the holding in King). 
254 See King, 569 U.S. at 465–66. 
255 See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2178 (“Blood tests are a different matter. They ‘require 
piercing the skin’ and extract a part of the subject’s body. And while humans exhale air from 
their lungs many times per minute, humans do not continually shed blood.” (quoting 
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625) (citations omitted)). 
256 Id. (emphasis added). 
257 Compare Saliva Samples Can Reveal Serious Illnesses, SCI. DAILY (July 29, 2013), 
https://bit.ly/2SEru2t [https://perma.cc/RGW8-GYSR] (noting limitations on disease 
detection using saliva samples), with Tim Jewell, All About Blood Tests, HEALTHLINE (Feb. 
19, 2019), https://bit.ly/37hq4gH [https://perma.cc/MGB8-9UGD] (describing the vast 
information about a person that can be obtained through blood samples). 
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Second, the Court seemingly placed some weight on the mental harm 
that blood draws can cause.258 That harm, however, was not the physical 
harm caused by administering the blood draw itself. Rather, the Court 
focused on the potential mental harm caused by the lingering prospect of 
the Government misusing such a broad array of personal information.259  
Similar concerns manifested in Carpenter. The Court in Carpenter 
bookended its analysis with some “basic guideposts” for assessing Fourth 
Amendment challenges to the Government’s use of technology.260 First, the 
Court noted, “the Fourth Amendment seeks to secure ‘the privacies of life’ 
against ‘arbitrary power.’”261 At the heart of this concept is the fundamental 
concern that the Government, equipped with the full power of the State, 
will use its authority to pry into the private lives of citizens.262 This concern 
emerges from the power imbalance that exists between the Government and 
the people. Without constitutional safeguards in place, the Government 
could use its power to intrude into peoples’ private affairs without facing any 
meaningful barriers. 
But the Court’s concerns do not end there. The second guidepost, the 
Court noted, is “a central aim of the Framers [] ‘to place obstacles in the 
way of a too permeating police surveillance.’”263 Assessed against the 
backdrop of the Court’s more recent Fourth Amendment technology 
cases,264 the Court’s concerns suggest a deeper distrust of the Government’s 
use of power to collect and use information that appears harmless—namely, 
a person’s locations over an extended period of time—but that reveals highly 
private, intimate details about peoples’ lives. The majority in Carpenter 
understood that CSLI reveals much more than a person’s location: it reveals 
information about who the person is through his or her “‘familial, political, 
professional, religious, and sexual associations.’”265  
A person’s movements and locations over an extended period of time 
can paint a detailed portrait of that person by revealing the person’s work 
                                                           
258 See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2178 (“Even if the law enforcement agency is precluded from 
testing the blood for any purpose other than to measure BAC, the potential remains and 
may result in anxiety for the person tested.”). 
259 See id. 
260 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213–16 (2018). 
261 See id. at 2214 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
262 See id. (“As technology has enhanced the Government’s capacity to encroach upon areas 
normally guarded from inquisitive eyes, this Court has sought to ‘assure preservation of that 
degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was 
adopted.’” (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001))). 
263 Id. at 2214. 
264 See supra Sections II.B.3.a–c. 
265 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 
(2012)). 
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and home addresses; the places that he or she does and does not visit; the 
businesses at which he or she shops; his or her place of worship; and 
whether the person visits the locations of political protests. And through 
CSLI, all of this information is conveniently timestamped to reveal the 
precise time at which the person arrived at a location, as well as the duration 
of time that elapsed before the person traveled to his or her next destination. 
Together, this information can reveal much about who the person is, 
including the people with whom he or she frequently, or infrequently, 
associates; the organizations in which he or she participates; and his or her 
spending preferences, religious affiliations, and level of political 
involvement. Carpenter thus represents more than the Court’s 
unwillingness to permit the Government to obtain information about a 
person’s location, but instead stands for the proposition that the information 
about a person that one can learn through extended surveillance of his or 
her movements paints a far-too-detailed portrait of that person’s life. 
Accordingly, people can reasonably expect to retain privacy in those 
details—regardless of the methods used to circumvent their expectations. 
It is against this backdrop that Part III assesses the privacy rights 
implicated when private actors obtain an individual’s biometric information. 
IV. CURRENT PRIVACY CLAIMS AND BIOMETRIC PRIVACY 
A. Privacy in Tort 
Over the course of several decades, the American right to privacy took 
shape in the civil context through four now-commonly recognized privacy 
torts.266 Privacy torts generally aim to protect individuals from “mental pain 
and distress” arising from privacy invasions267 and seek to remedy emotional, 
reputational, and proprietary injuries.268 This section first overviews the 
privacy tort most relevant to facial recognition technology—appropriation of 
name or likeness—and assesses the viability of appropriation claims that are 
based on privacy injuries caused by facial recognition technology in the 
social-media context. It concludes that such claims would likely fail. Next, 
this section uses O’Neill’s 10-Year Challenge theory to demonstrate how 
even appropriation-by-manipulation claims would also likely fail.  
                                                           
266 See supra notes 106–20 and accompanying text. 
267 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 98, at 196 (“[M]odern enterprise and invention have, 
through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater 
than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.”). 
268 See supra notes 106–20 and accompanying text. 
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1. Appropriation and Facebook’s Facial Recognition Techniques 
The appropriation tort protects an individual’s “exclusive use of his 
own identity, in so far as it is represented by his name or likeness, and in so 
far as the use may be of benefit to him or to others.”269 Under the definition 
of appropriation provided by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which 
many states have adopted, an appropriation occurs when a person 
appropriates “the name or likeness of another” for his or her “own use or 
benefit.”270  
a. Name or Likeness 
Most courts have found that the phrase “name or likeness” extends 
beyond a person’s actual name or likeness to broader aspects of the person’s 
identity.271 Accordingly, courts have held that “name or likeness” includes, 
among other things, nicknames,272 professions,273 identifying characteristics,274 
and catch phrases,275 provided that those aspects are reasonably tied to the 
injured party’s identity. On the other hand, “name or likeness” does not 
encompass matters generally removed from the person’s identity, such as a 
passing reference to a person.276  
                                                           
269 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. c (AM. LAW. INST. 1977). 
270 Id. § 652C. 
271 See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 106, at 218–19; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 652C cmt. c (“The interest protected by the rule stated in this Section is the 
interest of the individual in the exclusive use of his own identity, in so far as it is represented 
by his name or likeness, and in so far as the use may be of benefit to him or to others.”). 
272 See Hirsch v. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 137 (Wis. 1979) (finding the 
use of a famous football player’s nickname fell within the ambit of the appropriation tort) 
(“The fact that the name, ‘Crazylegs,’ used by [defendant], was a nickname rather than 
[plaintiff’s] actual name does not preclude a cause of action. All that is required is that the 
name clearly identify the wronged person.” (emphasis added)). 
273 See Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 726–29 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding a magazine’s 
depiction of a person with facial features similar to a famous boxer sitting near a boxing ring 
implicated the appropriation tort). 
274 See Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974) 
(finding a photograph that depicted a race car bearing similar, distinct characteristics of a 
famous race car driver constituted appropriation of the driver’s name or likeness). 
275 See Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 836 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(finding the use of a well-known television host’s catch phrase constituted appropriation of 
the host’s name or likeness). 
276 See Stien v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, 944 P.2d 374, 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (finding 
plaintiff failed to establish that the producers of a video in which her husband was featured 
making passing references to her did not constitute an appropriation of her name or 
likeness). 
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Facebook appropriates its users’ name or likeness by capturing and 
storing their facial biometrics. By definition, facial biometrics are inherent 
to a person’s identity.277 As the ACLU explained in a recent amicus brief, 
facial scans target the very essence of peoples’ identities because “each [face] 
is unique, and cannot be altered.”278 Similarly, the Illinois legislature found 
that biometric information is “biologically unique to the individual.”279 
b. Commercial or Other Value 
To prevail on an appropriation claim, plaintiffs in some states are 
required to show that the appropriated identity possesses some inherent 
value that the defendant exploited.280 In establishing these requirements, 
courts have relied on the language of the Restatement’s commentary, which 
limits the actionable conduct to a defendant’s appropriation of the 
“reputation, prestige, social or commercial standing, public interest or other 
values of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.”281 Some courts that impose these 
requirements have found it necessary for plaintiffs to prove that they possess 
some “notoriety or skill,”282 and others have required plaintiffs to show that 
their name or likeness carries some “market value” or “economic worth.”283 
Other courts, however, have found a showing of commercial value 
unnecessary. For example, in Fraley v. Facebook,284 the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of California found California’s appropriation 
statute requires no showing of a “preexisting value, and in fact can be read 
to presume that a person whose name, photograph, or likeness is used by 
another for commercial purposes without their consent is ‘injured as a result 
thereof.’”285  
                                                           
277 See Putting More than Just a Name to a Face, NEC, https://bit.ly/2BRkpkF 
[https://perma.cc/L5M3-V5RC] (“The human face plays an important role in our social 
interaction, conveying people’s identity.”); Facial Recognition, supra note 17 (“Like all 
biometrics solutions, face recognition technology measures and matches the unique 
characteristics for the purposes of identification or authentication.”). 
278 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees 
Seeking Affirmance at 13, Patel v. Facebook, 932 F.3d 1264, 1270–75 (9th Cir. 2019), 
https://bit.ly/2V3stG8 [https://perma.cc/JJV4-LTHK]. 
279 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/5(g) (LexisNexis 2019). 
280 See, e.g., Meadows v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 492 F.3d 634, 638 (5th Cir. 2007); Lawrence 
v. A.S. Abell Co., 475 A.2d 448, 453 (Md. 1984). 
281 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
282 See Meadows, 492 F.3d at 638. 
283 See Lawrence, 475 A.2d at 453. 
284 Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
285 Id. at 806 (assessing the injury element under California’s misappropriation statute). 
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Perhaps the schism stems from a misunderstanding of the distinction 
between the appropriation tort and the right of publicity tort. As the 
Supreme Court of Nevada noted in People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd.286: 
The common law appropriation tort ordinarily involves the 
unwanted and unpermitted use of the name or likeness of an 
ordinary, uncelebrated person for advertising or other such 
commercial purposes, although it is possible that the 
appropriation tort might arise from the misuse of another’s name 
for purposes not involving strictly monetary gain. The right of 
publicity tort, on the other hand, involves the appropriation of a 
celebrity’s name or identity for commercial purposes. The 
distinction between these two torts is the interest each seeks to 
protect. The appropriation tort seeks to protect an individual’s 
personal interest in privacy; the personal injury is measured in 
terms of the mental anguish that results from the appropriation 
of an ordinary individual’s identity. The right to publicity seeks to 
protect the property interest that a celebrity has in his or her 
name; the injury is not to personal privacy, it is the economic loss 
a celebrity suffers when someone else interferes with the property 
interest that he or she has in his or her name.287 
Absent a change in the ways in which state courts approach the 
appropriation tort, however, Facebook would likely avoid liability in the 
majority of appropriation cases. Under the commercial-value approach, a 
person must maintain celebrity status to mount a successful appropriation 
claim,288 leaving appropriation claims open to only a small portion of users.289 
                                                           
286 PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269 (Nev. 1995). 
287 Id. at 1283 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also Hirsch v. S. C. Johnson & Son, 
Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 132 (Wis. 1979) (“We conclude that the right of a person to be 
compensated for the use of his name for advertising purposes or purposes of trade is distinct 
from other privacy torts which protect primarily the mental interest in being let alone.”). 
288 See Note, In the Face of Danger: Facial Recognition and the Limits of Privacy Law, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 1870, 1880 (2007) (“[T]he only ones who can invoke [the misappropriation 
tort] are those whose names and faces are well recognized, and who therefore have 
commercial value that could be exploited—in short, celebrities.” (footnote omitted)). 
289 As of December 2018, there were over 2.32 billion Facebook users worldwide who used 
Facebook regularly each month. See Press Release, Facebook, Facebook Reports Fourth 
Quarter and Full Year 2018 Results (Jan. 30, 2019), https://bit.ly/2GBlMaW 
[https://perma.cc/V2V3-98HL]. Some estimates indicate that between approximately 1 in 
10,000 and 5 in 10,000 people worldwide are famous. See Samuel Arbesman, The Fraction 
of Famous People in the World, WIRED (Jan. 22, 2013), https://bit.ly/2nXPI5s 
[https://perma.cc/P7BD-TXRB]. The role of social-media “influencers” (i.e., users who have 
acquired a relatively large social-media following) might complicate these numbers, as 
influencers often receive payment through paid advertising and have therefore likely attained 
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c. Use or Benefit 
Problems again arise when assessing whether Facebook gathers and 
stores its users’ biometric data for its own “use or benefit.” While the 
Restatement’s approach encompasses instances where a person 
appropriates another’s name or likeness for any purpose or benefit—“even 
though the use is not a commercial one, and even though the benefit sought 
to be obtained is not a pecuniary one”290—some states limit liability to the 
appropriator’s commercial use.291 
For its part, Facebook claims to collect and use biometric data strictly 
to benefit users.292 And while some have observed that Facebook also uses 
the data to support its research into artificial intelligence technology,293 the 
link between that use and any potential pecuniary gain Facebook derives 
from the research may be too attenuated to satisfy the “use or benefit” 
element. Absent implementing a practice of selling its users’ biometric data 
to third parties, Facebook’s current biometric-data practices fall short of 
“commercial use.” 
d. Consent 
Perhaps the largest barrier to establishing liability is consent. While the 
concept of consent does not explicitly appear in the Restatement’s definition 
of appropriation,294 the absence of consent is a widely accepted requirement 
for appropriation claims. Some scholars have posited that lack of consent is 
an element implied in the definition of “appropriate”;295 others view consent 
                                                           
celebrity status for purposes of the appropriation tort. Accord Mona Hellenkemper, State of 
the Industry—Influencer Marketing in 2019, INFLUENCERDB (Jan. 14, 2019), 
https://bit.ly/35uvJ2l [https://perma.cc/2592-8LWS] (“Instagram today has more than 1.4 
million accounts with more than 15k followers.”). 
290 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
291 See id. (“Statutes in some states have, however, limited the liability to commercial uses of 
the name or likeness.”); see also Lee v. Picture People, Inc., No. K10C-07-002 (RBY), 2012 
Del. Super. LEXIS 159, at *6 (Mar. 19, 2012) (“Appropriation claims seek redress for the 
‘appropriation of some element of a person's personality for commercial use . . . .’” (quoting 
Guthridge v. Pen-Mod, Inc., 239 A.2d 709 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967))). 
292 See Facebook Face Recognition, supra note 35 (explaining how Facebook’s use of facial 
recognition technology is limited to creating a user-friendly experience); Sherman, supra note 
19 (same). 
293 See Bennett, supra note 20. 
294 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
295 See Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort 
Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 128 (2003). Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary defines “appropriate,” in part, as: “to take or make use of without authority or 
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as an affirmative defense.296 Indeed, some states have expressly incorporated 
“lack of consent” into the elements of an appropriation claim.297 
According to Prosser,298 consent serves as an affirmative defense to 
appropriation claims and “may be given expressly, or by conduct, such as 
posing for a picture with knowledge of the purposes for which it is to be 
used.”299 Thus, courts have held, consent can occur when a person 
voluntarily acts after the purported tortfeasor discloses to the person how it 
will use the surrendered information.300  
In the online context, a company’s privacy policy or terms of service 
may establish the basis for consent. For example, courts have found that 
consent exists when a person uses a company’s website and the company 
maintains a privacy policy that clearly (1) states the company’s intent to 
receive users’ information; (2) explains how the company will use that 
information; and (3) makes acceptance of the terms a precondition to using 
the website.301 These types of agreements are known as “browsewrap” 
agreements.302 When a company uses a browsewrap agreement, consent is 
valid even if the user did not read the privacy policy, “provided that the user 
                                                           
right.” Appropriate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://bit.ly/2T4SGXp [https://perma.cc/8D85-
9PL8]. 
296 See Prosser, supra note 113, at 419 (“Chief among the available defenses is that of the 
plaintiff's consent to the invasion, which will bar his recovery as in the case of any other tort.”). 
297 See, e.g., Perkins v. LinkedIn Corp., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1214 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
298 See supra notes 106–20 and accompanying text. 
299 Prosser, supra note 113, at 419. 
300 See In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
171124, at *39–42 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013) (finding plaintiffs failed to state a 
misappropriation claim because plaintiffs consented to using Google’s “+1” feature by 
voluntarily clicking on the “+1” feature after Google clearly disclosed how the feature 
worked). 
301 See Garcia v. Enter. Holdings, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2015). These 
types of contracts are known as “browsewrap agreements.” See id.  
Contracts formed on the Internet come primarily in two flavors: ‘clickwrap’ (or ‘click-
through’) agreements, in which website users are required to click on an ‘I agree’ box after 
being presented with a list of terms and conditions of use; and ‘browsewrap’ agreements, 
where a website’s terms and conditions of use are generally posted on the website via a 
hyperlink at the bottom of the screen. 
Id. (quoting Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2014)).  
In the context of “clickwrap” agreements, however, a user may successfully demonstrate lack 
of consent by producing evidence showing he or she did not click the “I agree” box because 
assent to the agreement arises when the user clicks on the box. See Garcia, 78 F. Supp. 3d 
at 1137. On the other hand, assent to “browsewrap” agreements arises when the user simply 
uses the website. Id. 
302 See supra note 301.  
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had actual knowledge of the agreement or the website put ‘a reasonably 
prudent user on notice of the terms of the contract.’”303 
Facebook uses a browsewrap agreement,304 which makes acceptance of 
Facebook’s data policy a precondition to using the platform.305 Thus, by 
using Facebook, users consent to the data policy, which clearly states that 
Facebook uses facial recognition technology if users “have it turned on.”306 
Accordingly, users are precluded from claiming misappropriation of their 
biometric data to the extent Facebook discloses how it uses their data.307 
Facebook provides several examples of how it currently uses facial-
recognition technology, which include assisting with “tagging” photos, 
detecting impersonation, and assisting users with visual impairments.308 
Thus, absent evidence showing Facebook uses its facial recognition 
technology for an undisclosed purpose,309 Facebook’s use of biometric data 
will not give rise to civil liability because consent will always stand in the way. 
                                                           
303 Garcia, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 1137 (quoting Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1177). 
304 See Terms of Service, supra note 24. 
305 See id. (“To provide these services, we must collect and use your personal data. We detail 
our practices in the Data Policy, which you must agree to in order to use our Products.”). 
306 See Data Policy, supra note 24 (“If you have it turned on, we use face recognition 
technology to recognize you in photos, videos and camera experiences.”). In the past, 
Facebook’s facial recognition technology was “turned on” by default. Sidney Fussell, 
Facebook's New Face Recognition Features: What We Do (and Don't) Know, GIZMODO 
(Feb. 27, 2018), https://bit.ly/2CXtplY [https://perma.cc/87MP-2PPQ]. However, Facebook 
recently announced a new face recognition feature that is turned off by default. Id. 
307 If, however, Facebook used a consumer’s data in a manner in which it failed to disclose, a 
plaintiff may plausibly argue that he or she did not consent. See Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 
798 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1095–96 (N.D. Cal. 2011). The plaintiffs in Cohen v. Facebook 
claimed Facebook misappropriated their names or likenesses when Facebook used their 
profile pictures to promote its “Friend Finder” service. See id. at 1094. Pointing to broad, 
sweeping statements in its Terms of Service, Facebook argued that the plaintiffs consented 
to such use. See id. at 1094–96. The court rejected Facebook’s argument, finding instead 
that “[n]othing in the provisions of the Terms documents to which Facebook has pointed 
constitutes a clear consent by users to have their name or profile picture shared in a manner 
that discloses what services on Facebook they have utilized, or to endorse those services.” 
Id. at 1095. 
308 See Facebook Face Recognition, supra note 35. 
309 Such a situation, however, does not fall outside the realm of possibility, given Facebook’s 
historical handling of users’ private information. In 2012, Facebook entered into a consent 
decree with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) after the FTC found Facebook was 
deceiving its users. See Agreement Containing Consent Order, In re Facebook, Inc., No. 
092-3184 (F.T.C. Aug. 10, 2012). The FTC’s complaint alleged, among other things, that 
Facebook told users that third-party apps could access users’ personal information only to 
the extent necessary to operate. See Complaint at 10, In re Facebook, Inc., No. 092-3184 
(F.T.C.). In reality, the FTC alleged, Facebook permitted third-party apps to access users’ 
information that was unrelated to the apps’ operations. Id. 
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2. Appropriation by Manipulation 
Even appropriation of biometric data by manipulation falls outside the 
purview of privacy-tort claims. Consider the 10-Year Challenge. 
Theoretically, if Facebook had generated and used the 10-Year Challenge 
as pretext to lure users into exposing their biometric data to Facebook’s 
facial recognition software, then participating users would be disclosing 
information that would have otherwise remained private but for Facebook’s 
inducement. In other words, Facebook would have caused its users to 
disclose their biometric information under false pretenses—regardless of 
whether users actually realized what information they were disclosing. 310 
While objectionable to some, this strategy does not implicate private tort 
liability. The reason—consent. 
Assuming a plaintiff can establish all the express elements of the 
appropriation tort,311 Facebook’s data policy312 remains a viable means by 
which Facebook can avoid liability. In fact, it is unlikely that the pretext 
under which Facebook theoretically obtained the information negates users’ 
consent at all. First, some courts have explicitly found that consent obtained 
under false pretenses does not invalidate otherwise valid consent.313 More 
important, however, is the context in which Facebook theoretically 
manipulated its users into disclosing their personal information: Facebook 
did not use pretext to obtain users’ consent; rather, it used pretext to obtain 
the information. By using Facebook’s services, users consent to Facebook’s 
data policy and thereby consent to any subsequent data collection.314 The 
consent subsists regardless of the circumstances under which the person 
posts to the platform and covers every subsequent act of data collection.  
Absent a major change in the law, Facebook and other data collectors 
can skirt tort liability even when they manipulate users into disclosing 
biometric information that would have otherwise remained private. In 
                                                           
310 See Anthony Cuthbertson, Most People Don’t Know About Facebook’s Invasive Data 
Practices, Study Finds, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 17, 2019), https://ind.pn/2sBL4wC 
[https://perma.cc/M2VU-BKQP] (reporting that a recent study found roughly seventy-five 
percent of Facebook users do not know how Facebook collects and uses their data). 
311 The express elements of an appropriation claim include: (1) the defendant appropriates 
the name or likeness of the plaintiff; and (2) the defendant did so for his or her own use or 
benefit. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also 
supra Section III.A.1. 
312 See Data Policy, supra note 24; see also supra notes 304–08 and accompanying text. 
313 See, e.g., Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745, 757 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (finding a plaintiff’s 
“improperly induced” consent barred her claim for intrusion upon seclusion). 
314 Consent to the data policy is a precondition to using Facebook’s platform; by using 
Facebook’s services, users consent to the policy. See supra notes 304–08 and accompanying 
text. 
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efforts to curb biometric privacy intrusions, three states have enacted laws 
that attempt to prevent biometric data-collection injuries but nevertheless 
fall short of protecting against practices designed to manipulate consumers 
into disclosing their information. The next section discusses those statutes. 
B. Biometric Privacy in State Statutory Law 
Illinois became the first state to enact a comprehensive biometric 
privacy law in 2008.315 Since then, only two other states—Texas and 
Washington—have enacted biometric privacy laws of similar, albeit lesser, 
magnitude.316 Meanwhile, federal efforts have stagnated.317 This section first 
overviews the three state laws that directly address biometric privacy. It then 
demonstrates how those laws fall short of protecting against pretextual 
biometric data-collection techniques. 
1. Statutory Protections at the State Level 
a. Illinois 
 In 2008, Illinois enacted the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy 
Act (BIPA)318 to protect its citizens’ biometric information from data 
collectors. In recent years, however, companies like Facebook have taken 
steps to erode BIPA’s protections. 
i. Overview of BIPA 
BIPA has become known as the “archetype” of biometric privacy laws 
for both its scope and enforcement provisions.319 The statute’s legislative 
                                                           
315 See Jane Bambauer, Biometric Privacy Laws: How a Little-Known Illinois Law Made 
Facebook Illegal 2 (2017), https://bit.ly/2GXl7Ag [https://perma.cc/6CUD-U4YU] 
(unpublished manuscript) (crediting Illinois as the first state to pass a comprehensive 
biometric privacy law). Other states have passed less-comprehensive biometric-privacy laws. 
See id. at 2 n.1. 
316 See infra Section III.B.1. 
317 For example, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 
2017, see S.2124, 115th Cong. (2017), which would have provided some federal protection 
of consumers’ biometric data, on November 14, 2017. The bill did not make it out of the 
Judiciary Committee. See S.2124—Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2017, 
CONGRESS.GOV, https://bit.ly/2SVdwcL [https://perma.cc/5MVR-S6S2]. 
318 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/1–14/99 (LexisNexis 2019). 
319 See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 315, at 2 (“The archetype example of a biometric privacy 
law is the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (‘BIPA’).”); Biometrics Laws and 
Privacy Policies, PRIVACYPOLICIES.COM, https://bit.ly/2E5k4el [https://perma.cc/D38P-
JZ39] (“[BIPA is] the archetype of biometric privacy laws that other states—Texas and 
Washington—would draw up on [sic] later.”). 
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findings and intent demonstrate the Illinois legislature’s concerns over (1) 
the growth in businesses that use biometric technology;320 (2) the risk of harm 
to which the technology exposes consumers and the anxiety resulting from 
that risk;321 and (3) the unknown ramifications of biometric technology.322 
Importantly, the Illinois General Assembly recognized that:  
Biometrics are unlike other unique identifiers that are used to 
access finances or other sensitive information. For example, 
social security numbers, when compromised, can be changed. 
Biometrics, however, are biologically unique to the individual; 
therefore, once compromised, the individual has no recourse, is 
at heightened risk for identity theft, and is likely to withdraw from 
biometric-facilitated transactions.323 
BIPA prohibits individuals, businesses, and other groups from 
collecting, capturing, purchasing, or otherwise obtaining a person’s 
“biometric identifier”324 or “biometric information,”325 without first: 
(1) inform[ing] the subject . . . in writing that a biometric identifier 
or biometric information is being collected or stored; 
(2) inform[ing] the subject . . . in writing of the specific purpose 
and length of term for which a biometric identifier or biometric 
information is being collected, stored, and used; and 
(3) receiv[ing] a written release executed by the subject of the 
biometric identifier or biometric information.326 
Additionally, BIPA strictly prohibits profiting off of another person’s 
biometric data327 and requires private actors to obtain express consent prior 
to disseminating the biometric information they collect.328 BIPA also 
imposes rigorous data-protection obligations329 and requires companies in 
possession of such data to implement and disclose to the public their 
retention policies.330 Most notably, however, BIPA provides a private right 
                                                           
320 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/5(a)–(b). 
321 Id. 14/5(c)–(e). 
322 Id. 14/5(f). 
323 Id. 14/5(c) (emphasis added). 
324 BIPA defines “biometric identifier” as “a retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan 
of hand or face geometry.” Id. 14/10. 
325 Under BIPA, the definition of “biometric information” includes “any information, 
regardless of how it is captured, converted, stored, or shared, based on an individual’s 
biometric identifier used to identify an individual.” Id. 
326 Id. 14/15(b). 
327 See id. 14/15(c). 
328 See id. 14/15(d). 
329 See id. 14/15(e). 
330 See id. 14/15(a). 
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of action for individuals harmed by violations of the statute,331 awarding 
$1000 in statutory damages for negligent violations332 and $5000 in statutory 
damages for intentional or reckless violations.333 
ii. Attacks on BIPA and Recent Litigation 
Private companies have made several attempts to undermine and 
seriously weaken BIPA’s protections. For instance, the New York Times 
reported in 2016 that Facebook had launched the lobbying effort334 behind 
an amendment to BIPA that would have removed protections against facial-
recognition scans and undercut then-ongoing litigation against Facebook 
and other companies that violated BIPA in its original form.335 Ultimately, 
the bill’s author announced that he would not call for a vote after privacy 
advocates and the Illinois Attorney General announced opposition to the 
bill.336 Nevertheless, Illinois state legislators continue to introduce bills that 
would undermine BIPA’s protections.337 
In addition to mounting legislative challenges, BIPA’s opponents have 
challenged the law in the courts.338 Of all the rulings issued in BIPA litigation, 
arguably the most consequential ruling was issued by the U.S. Court of 
                                                           
331 See id. 14/20. 
332 See id. 14/20(1). 
333 See id. 14/20(2). 
334 See Conor Dougherty, Tech Companies Take Their Legislative Concerns to the States, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2016), https://nyti.ms/34fEMEm [https://perma.cc/NW2H-9WG6] 
(“The amendment was lobbied for by Facebook . . . .”). 
335 Adam Schwartz, The Danger of Corporate Facial Recognition Tech, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND. (June 7, 2016), https://bit.ly/2DbeDL6 [https://perma.cc/N3XR-WR2G] 
[hereinafter Corporate Facial Recognition]. BIPA’s definition of “biometric identifier” 
excludes “photographs” from the definition. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/10. Among 
other substantive changes, the bill would have modified the word “photographs” with the 
words “physical or digital” and would have therefore excluded protections for both physical 
and digital photographs. See Letter from Privacy Groups to Sen. Terry Link, Ill. Gen. 
Assemb. 2 (May 27, 2016), https://bit.ly/35sk2ta [https://perma.cc/6CN6-BK8W]. In 
addition, the bill would have applied retroactively and therefore undercut claims in pending 
BIPA litigation. See H.R. 6074, S. Amend. 1, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 5(h) (Ill. 
2016). 
336 Corporate Facial Recognition, supra note 335. 
337 See, e.g., Adam Schwartz, New Attack on Illinois Biometric Privacy Act, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 10, 2018), https://bit.ly/2XQ83TP [https://perma.cc/Z56Z-LE3U]. 
338 See, e.g., Patel v. Facebook, 932 F.3d 1264, 1270–75 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding plaintiffs 
suffered an injury-in-fact, and therefore had standing to sue, when Facebook allegedly 
violated BIPA by not receiving the plaintiffs’ opt-in consent to Facebook’s use of facial 
recognition technology); Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶¶ 19–33 
(finding BIPA’s private right of action provisions apply even when the sole injury is a violation 
of a person’s statutory rights). 
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Patel v. Facebook.339 The plaintiffs in Patel—
who were all Illinois residents—filed suit against Facebook alleging that 
Facebook’s “Tag Suggestions” feature violated BIPA.340 The feature, which 
was enabled by default, used facial-recognition technology to detect whether 
users’ faces appeared in images posted to Facebook’s platform.341 The 
plaintiffs argued that Facebook violated their rights under BIPA when 
Facebook used facial-recognition technology on images displaying the 
plaintiffs’ faces without first obtaining the plaintiffs’ opt-in consent.342 
Facebook moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of Article III 
standing, arguing that the plaintiffs had not alleged any concrete injury.343 
The district court denied Facebook’s motion, and Facebook appealed to 
the Ninth Circuit.344 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had pleaded a 
concrete injury sufficient to confer standing to sue.345 Specifically, the Ninth 
Circuit found that the statutory violations alleged by the plaintiffs did not 
constitute mere “procedural” violations but instead amounted to concrete 
injuries-in-fact.346 Drawing on the origins and development of the right to 
privacy, in both the common-law and constitutional contexts, the Ninth 
                                                           
339 Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2019). 
340 Id. at 1268. 
341 Id. at 1267–68. 
342 See id. at 1268. 
343 Id. at 1269. The standing doctrine is rooted in the “cases and controversies” clause of 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). 
Article III limits the power of federal courts to deciding “cases and controversies.” U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 2. Over time, the Supreme Court has interpreted the clause to require 
plaintiffs to establish “standing” to sue a defendant. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547. The 
standing doctrine requires, in part, that the plaintiff “suffered an injury in fact” which occurs 
when the plaintiff “suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and 
particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. at 1547–48 
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). In Spokeo v. Robinson, 
the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff does not necessarily meet the “concrete injury” 
requirement “whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize 
that person to sue to vindicate that right.” Id. at 1549. “Bare procedural violation[s],” the 
Court explained, cannot form the basis for standing if the procedural violation did not give 
rise to an actual, concrete injury. Id. “In other words, for Article III purposes, it is not enough 
for a plaintiff to allege that a defendant has violated a right created by a statute; we must still 
ascertain whether the plaintiff suffered a concrete injury-in-fact due to the violation.” Patel, 
932 F.3d at 1270. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit in Patel had to determine whether the 
plaintiffs had alleged a “bare procedural violation” of BIPA or an actual, concrete injury. Id. 
at 1270–71. 
344 See Patel, 932 F.3dat 1269–70. 
345 See id. at 1275. 
346 See id. at 1271–74. 
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Circuit found that the privacy interests protected by BIPA align with the 
historic privacy interests protected in the common-law and Fourth-
Amendment contexts.347 The court drew heavily on the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Carpenter, finding many of the privacy concerns arising from 
CSLI also arose in the biometric-privacy context and therefore implicate 
“concrete interests in privacy”348: 
As in the Fourth Amendment context, the facial-recognition 
technology at issue here can obtain information that is “detailed, 
encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled,” which would be almost 
impossible without such technology. Once a face template of an 
individual is created, Facebook can use it to identify that 
individual in any of the other hundreds of millions of photos 
uploaded to Facebook each day, as well as determine when the 
individual was present at a specific location. Facebook can also 
identify the individual’s Facebook friends or acquaintances who 
are present in the photo. Taking into account the future 
development of such technology as suggested in Carpenter, it 
seems likely that a face-mapped individual could be identified 
from a surveillance photo taken on the streets or in an office 
building. Or a biometric face template could be used to unlock 
the face recognition lock on that individual’s cell phone. We 
conclude that the development of a face template using facial-
recognition technology without consent (as alleged here) invades 
an individual’s private affairs and concrete interests. Similar 
conduct is actionable at common law.349 
 The court in Patel concluded that Facebook’s alleged violations of 
BIPA “necessarily violate the plaintiffs’ substantive privacy interests.”350 The 
plaintiffs had alleged that Facebook violated BIPA’s provisions by failing to 
obtain written releases from each user prior to collecting, using, and storing 
their biometric identifiers and was therefore able to create and use face 
templates for each of the plaintiffs and to retain those templates for all 
time.351 The Ninth Circuit found that “[b]ecause the privacy right protected 
                                                           
347 See id. at 1273. Specifically, the court stated:  
In light of this historical background and the Supreme Court’s views regarding 
enhanced technological intrusions on the right to privacy, we conclude that an 
invasion of an individual’s biometric privacy rights ‘has a close relationship to a 
harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in 
English or American courts.’ 
Id. (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549). 
348 Id. at 1274 (quotation marks omitted). 
349 Id. at 1273 (quoting Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018)). 
350 Id. at 1274. 
351 Id. 
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by BIPA is the right not to be subject to the collection and use of such 
biometric data, Facebook’s alleged violation of these statutory requirements 
would necessarily violate the plaintiffs’ substantive privacy interests.”352 
Accordingly, the court concluded, the Patel plaintiffs alleged a concrete 
injury sufficient to establish Article III standing.353 
b. Texas 
Texas became the second state to pass a biometric information privacy 
law in 2009.354 While the Texas statute bears many of the same 
characteristics of BIPA, some have referred to the Texas law as “BIPA-lite” 
for its lack of teeth.355 Unlike BIPA, the Texas law does not create a private 
right of action for violations of the statute356 but instead permits the Texas 
Attorney General to enforce the statute through civil actions.357 And while 
the Texas law requires notice and consent before a person may capture 
another’s biometric identifiers,358 it does not require a written release.359 In 
addition, unlike BIPA, the Texas statute does not prohibit people from 
profiting off of the sale of someone else’s biometric information.360 
c. Washington 
Enacted in 2017, the Washington State biometric privacy law361 aims to 
protect consumers from businesses that collect biometric information 
without first receiving consumers’ consent.362 Much like the Texas law, 
                                                           
352 Id. 
353 Id. 
354 See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001 (2017). 
355 See John G. Browning, The Battle Over Biometrics, 81 TEX. B.J. 674, 676 (2018). 
356 See id. 
357 See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(d) (2017). The statute provides that the 
Texas Attorney General may obtain up to $25,000 per violation in damages. See id. 
358 Id. § 503.001(b)–(c). These notice and consent requirements, however, only apply to 
instances where the person capturing or possessing the information does so for a 
“commercial purpose.” See id. 
359 See Browning, supra note 355, at 676. 
360 See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001 (2017). 
361 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.375.010–.040 (LexisNexis 2019).  
362 See id. § 19.375.900. In the law’s finding and intent section, the legislature noted:  
[The] citizens of Washington are increasingly asked to disclose sensitive 
biological information that uniquely identifies them for commerce, security, and 
convenience. The collection and marketing of biometric information about 
individuals, without consent or knowledge of the individual whose data is 
collected, is of increasing concern. The legislature intends to require a business 
that collects and can attribute biometric data to a specific uniquely identified 
individual to disclose how it uses that biometric data, and provide notice to and 
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however, the Washington law does not create a private right of action but 
instead delegates enforcement to the Washington State Attorney General 
through the state’s consumer protection act363 and does not require written 
consent.364 The law, which only covers commercial uses of biometric 
identifiers,365 prohibits the collection of a person’s biometric identifiers “in 
a database for a commercial purpose” without first providing notice to and 
obtaining consent from that person.366 The Washington law also requires 
companies to obtain consent before selling, leasing, or otherwise disclosing 
a person’s biometric identifiers absent specific, unique circumstances.367 
Despite its similarities to the Texas law, the Washington law arguably 
provides less protection than its counterparts. When the Washington bill 
was originally introduced, it provided fairly robust biometric-privacy 
protections, including protections against surreptitious collection of 
biometric information through facial recognition technology.368 The bill’s 
                                                           
obtain consent from an individual before enrolling or changing the use of that 
individual’s biometric identifiers in a database. 
Id.  
363 See id. § 19.375.030(2). 
364 See Browning, supra note 355, at 676. 
365 See generally WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.020 (LexisNexis 2019). The law defines 
“biometric identifier” as “data generated by automatic measurements of an individual’s 
biological characteristics, such as a fingerprint, voiceprint, eye retinas, irises, or other unique 
biological patterns or characteristics that is used to identify a specific individual.” Id. § 
19.375.010(1). 
366 Id. § 19.375.020(1). 
367 See id. § 19.375.020(3). Those circumstances include instances where disclosure: 
(b) Is necessary to provide a product or service subscribed to, requested, or 
expressly authorized by the individual; 
(c) Is necessary to effect, administer, enforce, or complete a financial transaction 
that the individual requested, initiated, or authorized, and the third party to 
whom the biometric identifier is disclosed maintains confidentiality of the 
biometric identifier and does not further disclose the biometric identifier except 
as otherwise permitted . . . ; 
(d) Is required or expressly authorized by a federal or state statute, or court 
order; 
(e) Is made to a third party who contractually promises that the biometric 
identifier will not be further disclosed and will not be enrolled in a database for 
a commercial purpose inconsistent with the notice and consent described in [the 
statute]; or 
(f) Is made to prepare for litigation or to respond to or participate in judicial 
process. 
Id. 
368 See H.R. 1094, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(4) (Wash. 2015). Specifically, the original bill’s 
definition of “biometric identifier” included “less sensitive identifiers, including, but not 
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final form, however, included no reference to facial-recognition 
technology369 and excluded some of the most troubling aspects of biometric 
identification.370 
2. Applicability of State Statutes to the 10-Year Challenge 
While the state biometric-privacy laws discussed above provide 
additional protections to consumers, the laws nevertheless fall short of 
protecting consumers against pretextual-collection tactics, such as those 
                                                           
limited to facial imaging, voice, and gait when used specifically for identification purposes.” 
Id. 
369 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.010(1) (LexisNexis 2019). The final legislation 
defined “biometric identifier,” in its entirety, as follows: 
“Biometric identifier” means data generated by automatic measurements of an 
individual’s biological characteristics, such as a fingerprint, voiceprint, eye 
retinas, irises, or other unique biological patterns or characteristics that is used 
to identify a specific individual. “Biometric identifier” does not include a 
physical or digital photograph, video or audio recording or data generated 
therefrom, or information collected, used, or stored for health care treatment, 
payment, or operations under the federal health insurance portability and 
accountability act of 1996. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
370 For example, in a letter of opposition to a later form of the Washington bill, the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation raised the following concerns: 
It appears that the bill would not address ordinary people’s concern about surreptitious 
collection of biometric information in commercial venues. A shopping mall could, with 
impunity, face-scan or iris-scan mall visitors for marketing purposes because the mall visitors 
would not be “access[ing] a system or account.” We think most people would be surprised 
that the bill excludes such biometric collection. Moreover, the mall apparently would have 
no duty of reasonable care under Sec. 4(a). We are also concerned that this limited 
definition, combined with Sec. 4 of the bill (enforcement by attorney general under state 
consumer protection law), will be taken to mean that the legislature is comfortable with all 
other biometric collection. 
Letter from Lee Tien, Senior Staff Attorney, Elec. Frontier Found., to Rep. Mark 
Hemsworth, Wash. House of Representatives, and Rep. Jeff Morris, Wash. House of 
Representatives (Feb. 22, 2016), https://bit.ly/2KN769b [https://perma.cc/7J8D-GGEL]. 
The Washington law’s definition of “biometric identifier” no longer limits its coverage of 
collection of biometric data to instances where an individual “accesses a system or account.” 
Compare H.R. 1094, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3(2) (Wash.  2016) (“‘Biometric identifier’” 
means data generated by automatic measurements of an individual’s biological characteristics 
. . . [used to] authenticate an individual’s identity when the individual accesses a system or 
account.”), with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.010(1) (LexisNexis 2019). Nevertheless, 
the current form of the law excludes from the definition “a physical or digital photograph, 
video or audio recording or data generated therefrom” and makes no express reference to 
facial recognition technology. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.010(1) (LexisNexis 
2019). 
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hypothetically behind the 10-Year Challenge.371 The notice and consent 
provisions are the major force behind these laws, yet protections that hinge 
on consent often fall short.372 When consumers consent to surrendering 
their data before starting to use a third party’s service, they agree to 
continually surrender their personal information to that third party each 
time they use the service. Thus, each disclosure is based, at least in theory, 
on the consumer’s own volition and uninhibited choice. That dynamic 
changes, however, when the party seeking the information pretextually 
inserts itself into the consumer’s decision-making process. Because the 
statutory consent provisions permit businesses to use one-time consent as a 
license to all subsequent data gathering, nothing prevents companies from 
luring (or even compelling) otherwise private information into the public 
sphere.  
Moreover, even if the statutes prohibited pretextual-collection tactics, 
the statutes hardly deter companies from engaging in this type of behavior. 
While citizens of Illinois may seek relief through private suits, citizens of 
Texas and Washington are forced to rely on government enforcement, 
which is often limited by constrained resources and enforcement 
priorities.373 The inherent problems of this patchwork approach to biometric 
privacy necessitate a federal solution. 
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The privacy implications of biometrics extend beyond expectations of 
privacy in one’s facial geometry or fingerprint pattern.374 In 2007, the U.S. 
government acknowledged that a person’s biometric information “can be 
used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity.”375 Today, both private 
and state actors increasingly use biometrics both to identify and to verify 
individuals’ identities:376 banks have begun using facial recognition instead of 
PIN numbers and passwords to provide access to customers’ bank 
                                                           
371 See supra notes 3–12 and accompanying text. 
372 See supra Section III.A.1.d. 
373 See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“The aggregation of 
individual claims in the context of a classwide suit is an evolutionary response to the existence 
of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of government.”). 
374 See supra notes 76–96 and accompanying text. 
375 OMB MEMO, supra note 21, at 1 n.1. 
376 See Danny Thakkar, Global Biometric Market Analysis: Trends and Future Prospects, 
BAYOMETRIC, https://bit.ly/2VhxevQ [https://perma.cc/QN8L-CLKA]. 
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accounts377 and digital wallets, such as Apple Pay,378 use fingerprint and facial 
scans to authorize payments.379 But some companies have gone beyond 
using biometrics to ensure the security of information and have instead 
begun trading biometric information as a commodity.380 Researchers even 
predict that marketers could one day use facial recognition technology to 
identify a person on the street and instantaneously retrieve that person’s 
credit score.381 Much like blood and DNA samples, as well as CSLI,382 facial 
biometrics can reveal a wide swath of intimate information about a person, 
and the potential for misuse or mishandling of that information “may result 
in anxiety for the person” to whom the information is connected.383 That 
anxiety may only be exacerbated by recent upticks in large-scale data 
breaches384 and the proliferation of “lower cost biometric handheld devices 
[that] now make it possible to obtain rapid identification virtually 
anywhere.”385 
Today’s online society has made biometric data collection inevitable, 
reinforced by the unequal bargaining relationship between consumers and 
                                                           
377 See Jeanne Lee, More Banks Turn to Biometrics to Keep an Eye on Security, 
NERDWALLET (May 20, 2016), https://bit.ly/22mfaP9 [https://perma.cc/6ZVR-89XP]. 
378 Apply Pay is a mobile payment app that allows users to make contact-less payments. See 
Pay, APPLE PAY, https://apple.co/1rmmha4 [https://perma.cc/8W6G-2X55]. 
379 See Biometrics: Are Fingerprint ID and Facial Recognition Secure?, FIREFLY CREDIT 
UNION: LIFE ILLUMINATED (Jan. 30, 2019), https://bit.ly/2NqCZER 
[https://perma.cc/8NNY-9HYQ]. 
380 See supra notes 76–96 and accompanying text. 
381 See Natasha Singer, Face Recognition Makes the Leap from Sci-Fi, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 
2011), https://nyti.ms/2SVfGcn [https://perma.cc/4HYZ-URTL]. In a 2011 study, for 
example, researchers at Carnegie Mellon University used “off-the-shelf facial recognition 
software” to identify anonymous college students by comparing photographs of those 
students to photographs publicly available on Facebook. Id. The researchers then used the 
information available on some students’ Facebook profiles to identify their interests and 
predict parts of their social security numbers. Id.  
382 See supra Section II.B.3. 
383 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2178 (2016). 
384 See Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need to Know as 
Fallout Widens, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2HP4Dr3 
[https://perma.cc/28S5-D5ZA] (reporting that a political data firm gained access to more than 
50 million Facebook users’ private information and had tools to influence voter behavior); 
Brian Fung, Equifax’s Massive 2017 Data Breach Keeps Getting Worse, WASH. POST (Mar. 
1, 2018), https://wapo.st/2U5aQWr [https://perma.cc/K3BU-H9J2] (reporting that as many 
as 147.9 million people may have been affected by the 2017 Equifax data breach, which 
revealed partial driver’s license data of consumers). 
385 NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, SUBCOMM. ON BIOMETRICS & IDENTITY MGMT., THE 
NATIONAL BIOMETRICS CHALLENGE 19 (Sept. 2011). 
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the companies that traffic in biometrics.386 While many companies collect 
biometric information for the limited purpose of providing verification 
technology, many others collect that information to monetize their 
consumers’ personal identities.387 In fact, personal information has now, in 
many instances, replaced cash payments, causing many consumers to 
believe that the services they use each day are “free.”388 To use the services 
that these companies provide, participating consumers have no option but 
to agree—through carefully crafted terms-of-service agreements—to hand 
over their personal information. But whereas consumers in the past knew 
what they were giving up in return for a good or service (i.e., money), 
consumers of these so-called “free” services often do not realize that they 
are in fact making payment with their personal information, an arguably 
much more valuable and risky form of contractual consideration.389 And as 
technology continues to pervade every aspect of modern life, consumers will 
only become more dependent on these services, making life in the modern 
world without constantly surrendering personal information nearly 
impossible.390  
                                                           
386 See A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY, supra note 84, at 1–2 (discussing the 
recent societal shift toward conducting everyday activities on the Internet). 
387 See McKenna, supra note 78, at 1067–68. According to Facebook’s CEO, Mark 
Zuckerberg, Facebook does not sell its users’ data, despite reports to the contrary. See Mark 
Zuckerberg, The Facts About Facebook, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2019), 
https://on.wsj.com/33z0nGz [https://perma.cc/EN5R-PB8N]. 
388 See Will Oremus, Are You Really the Product?, SLATE (Apr. 27, 2018), 
https://bit.ly/34B7OP1 [https://perma.cc/9MYV-RDU5]. Mark Zuckerberg explained the 
payment dynamic in a Wall Street Journal op-ed:  
[B]ased on what pages people like, what they click on, and other signals, we create 
categories—for example, people who like pages about gardening and live in Spain—and then 
charge advertisers to show ads to that category. Although advertising to specific groups existed 
well before the internet, online advertising allows much more precise targeting and therefore 
more-relevant ads. . . . In an ordinary transaction, you pay a company for a product or service 
they provide. Here you get our services for free—and we work separately with advertisers to 
show you relevant ads.  
Zuckerberg, supra note 387. 
389 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID 
CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 25–28 (Dec. 
2010), https://bit.ly/34C8pzQ [https://perma.cc/RSR7-SFXU] [hereinafter FTC PROPOSED 
FRAMEWORK] (“[M]any data collection and use practices are invisible to consumers. . . . 
[C]onsumers often do not understand the extent to which their data is shared with third 
parties.”); McKenna, supra note 78, at 1067–68, 1076. 
390 Accord Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (“[C]ell phones and the 
services they provide are ‘such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life’ that carrying one is 
indispensable to participation in modern society.” (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 
385 (2014))). 
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This type of arbitrary power, used to exploit an already unequal 
bargaining relationship, is ripe for federal constraints. Common-law 
remedies have not kept up with technology in protecting privacy interests.391 
And while a few state laws provide some additional protections, those 
protections do not cross state borders and are based on archaic 
understandings of consent that fail to prevent businesses from manipulating 
consumers into disclosing information that they would have otherwise kept 
private. Even broader federal consumer-protection laws fail to prevent this 
type of dubious conduct.392 
 While the Fourth Amendment’s approach to privacy and modern 
technology can provide guidance in this area,393 Fourth-Amendment 
precepts—namely, the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test—fall short of 
providing a biometric-privacy solution. The Government’s ability to collect 
private information is limited by a person’s reasonable expectations of 
privacy.394 On the other hand, absent industry-specific legislation, the only 
restraints on private industry’s ability to collect biometric information are 
contractual arrangements between companies and consumers.395 Those 
contractual arrangements, however, arise from unequal bargaining 
relationships in which the consumer must choose either to accept the terms 
or to forgo the service. At the same time, many consumers are unaware both 
that private companies are handling their biometric information and, more 
importantly, of the breadth of information that biometrics can reveal about 
them.396 Moreover, most of those agreements do not contemplate limitations 
on the company’s access to the information or the methods by which the 
company can gather the information. Accordingly, companies can use any 
methods they deem fit to compel consumers to disclose their information—
                                                           
391 See supra Section III.A. 
392 See FTC PROPOSED FRAMEWORK, supra note 389, at 19–20. Although the FTC Act 
prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” and provides the 
FTC with enforcement authority for FTC Act violations, see 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2018), the FTC 
has acknowledged “limitations” in its approach to privacy-based harms. See FTC PROPOSED 
FRAMEWORK, supra note 389, at 19–20. 
393 See supra Section II.B.3. 
394 See supra Section II.B.2–3. 
395 See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 106, at 786–90 (discussing the United States’ 
“sectoral approach” to consumer privacy).  
Consumer privacy in the United States is regulated by ‘sectoral’ laws that focus on various 
sectors of the economy. Different laws regulate different industries. In contrast to the United 
States, Europe and many other countries have an ‘omnibus’ approach toward regulating 
privacy. Under an omnibus approach, one overarching statute regulates personal information 
use irrespective of the entities or industry that wishes to process the information. 
Id. at 786. 
396 See Cuthbertson, supra note 310; see also supra Section I.B. 
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even manipulation. Each of these layers coalesce into a dynamic that 
undercuts application of the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test in favor 
of less privacy. 
The federal government has begun taking steps toward protecting 
biometric-information privacy through federal legislation.397 While those 
efforts are laudable, it is important for the federal response to fill the gaps 
in the current state statutory schemes.398 A federal response to appropriation 
by manipulation would not be the first time that the federal government has 
addressed such dubious behavior. For instance, in 2006, the federal 
government enacted the Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act of 
2006 (TRPPA),399 which prohibits people from “knowingly and intentionally 
obtain[ing], or attempt[ing] to obtain, confidential phone records 
information” from telecommunication providers “by (1) making false or 
fraudulent statements or representations to an employee of a 
[telecommunications provider]; [or] (2) making such false or fraudulent 
statements or representations to a customer of a [telecommunications 
provider].”400 The concern that Congress sought to address at the time was 
a practice known as “pretexting.”401  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “pretext” as “[a] false or weak reason 
or motive advanced to hide actual or strong reason or motive.”402 The 
concept of “pretexting” reached the public’s consciousness in 2006 after 
news of a spying scandal involving Hewlett-Packard broke.403 The reports 
described actions taken by Hewlett-Packard’s board of directors to identify 
the source of an information leak.404 According to the reports, Hewlett-
                                                           
397 See, e.g., Personal Data Notification and Protection Act of 2017, H.R. 3806, 115th Cong. 
(2017); Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2017, S. 2125, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 3816, 
115th Cong. (2017). 
398 At the same time, however, the federal response should not preempt state laws designed 
to protect biometric privacy, as some of the introduced federal legislation attempts to do. See 
American Data Dissemination Act of 2019, S. 142, 116th Cong. (2019). 
399 Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-476, 120 Stat. 
3568 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
400 18 U.S.C. § 1039(a)(1)–(2) (2018). 
401 See Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-476 § 
2(4)(B), 120 Stat. 3568. 
402 See Pretext, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1999); see also Pretext, BALLENTINE’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969) (defining “pretext” as “[a]n ostensible reason or motive 
assigned or assumed as a color or cover for the real reason or motive; false appearance; 
pretense”). 
403 See David A. Kaplan, Suspicions and Spies in Silicon Valley, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 17, 2006), 
https://bit.ly/37nWQhh [https://perma.cc/V5VW-YZR3] (breaking the news of the Hewlett-
Packard spying scandal). 
404 See id. 
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Packard admitted that the board launched an investigation into the leaks, 
which included obtaining the phone records of board members and 
journalists by impersonation.405  
The United States House Committee on Energy and Commerce 
(“Committee”) launched an investigation into Hewlett-Packard’s actions 
shortly after the news broke.406 During Committee hearings, members of the 
Committee made clear the implications of this type of activity in terms of 
both the general privacy concerns and the ramifications of these types of 
privacy intrusions: 
To be clear what we are talking about, pretexting, or “social 
engineering,” means using fraud, deceit, and impersonation to 
acquire someone’s personal records without his consent. In this 
high-tech age, personal information is not only valuable, but 
vulnerable, and the relative ease with which unscrupulous 
pretexters can literally con their way into our personal lives is 
cause for great concern.407 
 The Committee also acknowledged and expressed surprise that the 
broader federal consumer protection laws—namely, Section 5 of the FTC 
Act—shielded against these types of acts but nevertheless failed to deter 
wrongdoers due to a lack of explicit statutory prohibitions: 
The FTC had successfully brought pretexting cases under its 
Section 5 authority which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts and 
practices. You would have thought that that would have set the 
stage for understanding that this is not a legal act. A number of 
States, including my home State of Illinois, under our Attorney 
General Lisa Madigan, used their general consumer protection 
and consumer fraud statutes to file suits against the practice, and 
now, along with 11 other States, Illinois has passed a law. But 
obviously there are still those who missed the point and choose 
to dabble in what they claim is a grey area of the law.408 
The Committee’s Hewlett-Packard hearings ultimately served as the 
catalyst for the TRPPA’s passage.409 In the TRPPA’s congressional findings, 
Congress noted that: 
                                                           
405 See Scott Horsley, Dunn, Others Charged in HP Spying Case, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 
4, 2006), https://n.pr/2OxregC [https://perma.cc/C6V7-RR68]. 
406 See James S. Granelli, HP’s CEO Offers to Testify to Congress About Spying Scandal, 
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2006), https://lat.ms/2rVnJsM [https://perma.cc/XW44-AAUB]. 
407 Hewlett-Packard’s Pretexting Scandal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & 
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 109th Cong. 3 (2006) (statement 
of Rep. Ed Whitfield, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations). 
408 Id. at 17 (statement of Rep. Schakowsky). 
409 See Kim Zetter, First ‘Pretexting’ Charges Filed Under Law Passed After HP Spy Scandal, 
WIRED (Jan. 9, 2009), https://bit.ly/33EArJv [https://perma.cc/TNJ3-AMQZ]. The House 
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[T]elephone records have been obtained without the knowledge 
or consent of consumers through the use of a number of 
fraudulent methods and devices that include . . . ‘‘pretexting’’, 
whereby a data broker or other person represents that they are 
an authorized consumer and convinces an agent of the telephone 
company to release the data.410 
Congress’s response to the pretexting problem can guide federal 
legislation addressing future manipulative collection tactics employed by 
biometric-data collectors.411 Like an individual who seeks to obtain 
telephone records by impersonating an authorized consumer, companies 
seeking to obtain consumers’ biometric data under false pretenses cause 
otherwise private information to be revealed through manipulation.  
The current problem, however, raises a dilemma not present in 2006—
consent. Consider the 10-Year Challenge. While pretexting occurs without 
the information owner’s consent, Facebook’s theoretical acquisition of 
users’ information occurred after the users consented to Facebook’s data 
policy. This distinction clearly complicates the comparison. The federal 
response must therefore reconceptualize how consumers consent to 
biometric data-collection practices. The validity of consent to biometric data 
collection should account not only for the company’s ability to collect 
consumers’ data but also for the context in which that data is made available 
to the company. For example, a BIPA-compliant consent agreement may 
suffice when consumers disclose biometric information strictly by their own 
volition.412 However, if a company initiates pretextual campaigns or other 
strategies to lure users into disclosing biometric information, then the 
company should be required to again (1) notify its consumers of its data-
collection practices and (2) seek its consumers’ consent to collect that 
information on a per-capture basis.  
                                                           
of Representatives passed the bill in April 2006, but the Senate initially made no progress on 
the bill. See H.R.4709 - Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act of 2006, 
CONGRESS.GOV, https://bit.ly/37SRISN [https://perma.cc/U33Z-BPTB] (follow “Actions” 
hyperlink). Three months after reports of Hewlett-Packard’s pretexting scandal broke, 
however, the Senate unanimously passed the bill. See id. 
410 Id. 
411 The pretexting example is admittedly imperfect. Pretexting involves a third party contacting 
another third party to obtain an individual’s records by impersonating that individual. 
Appropriation by manipulation, on the other hand, involves a third party using false 
pretenses to coax a consumer into disclosing his or her private information. Nevertheless, 
both actions involve some level of deceit by the wrongdoer to obtain otherwise private 
information. The remedies set forth below are meant to account for the defects in the 
comparison. See infra notes 413–15 and accompanying text. 
412 See supra note 326 and accompanying text. 
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The consequences for failure to comply with these requirements 
should not carry the same weight as the consequences attached to the 
TRPPA.413 While using manipulative tactics to lure disclosure of biometric 
information is suspect and certainly amounts to an invasion of privacy, this 
type of act does not measure up to the level of fraud inherent in the 
pretexting scandal and should therefore not be treated as a criminal act.414 
Instead, the consequences should aim to promote responsible data-
gathering, -storage, and -use practices without stifling innovation. 
Accordingly, the legislation should provide a private cause of action to 
injured consumers. And because damages may be uncertain,415 the 
legislation should provide for statutory damages. By empowering the 
plaintiffs’ bar to pursue these types of actions, companies should 
theoretically be more willing to comply with the requirements and, in turn, 
consumers may become more aware that they are disclosing sensitive 
information.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
While O’Neill’s semi-sarcastic416 concerns over the 10-Year 
Challenge’s implications may have not accurately reflected the reality of 
Facebook’s role in the challenge’s inception,417 the op-ed nevertheless shines 
light on some of the gaps in U.S. privacy law. Current U.S. laws do not 
adequately protect consumers’ biometric information, despite the 
information’s highly sensitive and private nature. Even laws containing 
relatively robust notice and consent provisions permit biometric data 
collectors to exploit the U.S. legal system’s current understanding of 
“consent” by luring consumers into disclosing information that they would 
have retained but-for the data collector’s actions. Any attempts at 
comprehensive federal legislation should account for these concerns. 
  
                                                           
413 Violations of the TRPPA carry criminal penalties, including fines, imprisonment up to ten 
years, or both. See 18 U.S.C. § 1039(a). 
414 On the other hand, there are instances where taking such actions could warrant criminal 
charges. Those types of situations, however, are not contemplated in the hypothetical 
scenarios set forth in this Article. 
415 See, e.g., Kehoe v. Fid. Fed. Bank & Trust, 421 F.3d 1209, 1213 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(“Damages for a violation of an individual’s privacy are a quintessential example of damages 
that are uncertain and possibly unmeasurable.”). 
416 See O’Neill, supra note 5 (explaining that O’Neill’s argument originated from a “semi-
sarcastic tweet”). 
417 See Facebook Response, supra note 9 (“The 10 year challenge is a user-generated meme 
that started on its own, without our involvement. It’s evidence of the fun people have on 
Facebook, and that’s it.”). 
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